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For those interested in local government, Winnipeg is unique arrong the 
metropolitan areas in Canada as it has undergone two major and distinctly 
different reforms; Metro Winnipeg in 1960, and Unicity Winnipeg in 1971. As 
will be described in the detailed discussion that follows, the story of refonn 
begins imnediately following World War II, a period of change and uncertainty 
when it was realised r.ba.t the full employment and economic well-being 
occasioned by the war would care to an end, and a retum to the conditions of 
unemployment experienced in the 1930s could, and probably would, retum. In 
response to this concern the provincial govermnent, in particular, began to 
consider ways and means for stimulating the econari'!Y. It was in these 
considerations that the idea of local govermnent refonn had its genesis. 
In 1946 the metropolitan area had a population of 320,484 of which 229,045, 
or 82 per cent, lived in the City of Winnipeg. In addition to the City of 
Winnipeg, the City of St. Boniface and the nnmicipalities of St. James, St. 
Vital, Tuxedo, Transcona, Fort GarJ:y and East and West Kildonan had urban 
areas, while the outer ring of nnmicipalities showed evidence of urban sprawl 
and ribbon developuent along the principal highways. The need for inter-
municipa.l co-operation had already been acknowledged by the creation of the 
Greater Winnipeg Water and Sanitary Districts to provide the urban 
municipa.lities with a bulk water supply and the treat:nent of sanitary sewage. 
As the metropolitan area accarrm:x:lated 44 per cent of the provincial 
population, and was expected to maintain and probably increase its share of 
the provincial population, and as it already had the characteristics of a 
metropolis - an urban area fragmented into a number of nnmicipal jurisdictions 
- it was apparent that sarre mechanism would have to be found to deal with the 
expansion of services into the suburbs. 
It also became apparent that the expansion of services would have to be 
carried out in accordance with a rational plan so that the beriefits of what 
could be a substantial capital investment could be maximized.. Initially 
inter-mmi.cipal co-operation was used for the expansion of services and for 
planning. As the inadequacies of co-operation became apparent in the 1950s, a 
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two-t:ier:" goveoment was initiated.. Subsequently, in the late 1960s, the need 
for reassessment of local govern:ment in the metropolitan area produced 
proposals for a rncx:lified tv.Jo-tier system (which was not adopted.), and the 
introduced a radical new approach, a fon:n of aoalgamati.on in the interests of 
efficient service provision, but with decentralization of the political 
pr:ocess to respond to the need for more open govern:ment, in which the citizens 
could participate. 
Before discussing Winnipeg in detail, the metropolitan area which is the 
subject of this paper, it is essential to suggest how the effectiveness of 
local govermnent should be assessed. In IIEking this judgement it should be 
acJmowledged that local govern:ments have two main functions. 1 The first is 
the service function, the responsibility for providing an ever-widening range 
of services, of Vl7hich the increase in the provision of _social services is a 
marked characteristic of post-war society. The second function is political 
which has been defined as "that of managing conflict in matters of [local] 
public importance. "2 .Although local politics does not always involve the 
management of conflict, it is i:mp:>rtant to remember that the difficult and 
interesting issues that need to be resolved. usually involve same kind of 
conflict. These tv.7o roles differ and the management of local government 
affairs involves a continuing process of maintaining a balance between 
sometimes carrpeting functions. 
As this paper will include corrmmts on the effectiveness of refon:n in 
Winnipeg, criteria need to be defined. ·Effectiveness can be judged by how 
well the government fulfills the function of maintaining the balance mentioned 
above, while demonstrating the following characteristics: 
- efficiency in the economic sense, that is, an appropriate relationship 
between cost and benefit 
- :responsiveness or how well all shades of carmnmity opinion are 
reflected in municipal decisions 
- openness or the extent to Vl7hich municipal decisions are made in public 
and the extent to which all parties interested in the decision have 
access to the infonnation available to the municipal decision-makers 
- representation the extent to Vl7h.ich the electoral system provides for 
the expression of all shades of carmnmity opinion 
- leader:sbip, an often overlooked characteristic 
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- flexihj l jty or the degree to which the process of nak:i..ng local 
decisions allows for response to change or to peculiar circumstances in 
situations which may superficially appear to be the same 
- ccmniti::DEnt or the degree to which nnmicipal decision-makers observe 
the policies they establish, thus giving the citizens the assurance 
that like situations will be dealt with consistently and that programs 
will be persued energetically. 
One additional point needs to be made by way of introduction. This is to 
errphasize the significance of the bebav:i.oural characteristics of both local 
govermnents and the senior, influential individuals involved, both elected and 
appointed. Emphasis on behaviour is consistent with the belief that, in the 
final analysis, it is the way in which ,people act and react in governing 
themselves that is .irry;:lortant, particularly in local governrnent where most of 
the decisions directly affecting the lives of the citizens are made. 
Events during the period 1953 to 1967 will be described from the vantage 
point of a participant-observer, while the discussion of subsequent events 
draws upon a number of conversations with those who were directly involved. 
Although an honest attempt at objectivity has been made - and the passage of 
years has helped - certain. biases which persist should be acknowledged. 
This paper was influenced by a strong belief in the need for local 
governrnent based on same 40 years of involverrent as a plarmer, administrator 
and teacher. In passing it can be observed that, contrary to popular opinion, 
stupidity and corruption have been remarkably absent in the local governrnents 
it has been nw duty to serve. A second bias is for the two-tier system - it 
provides greater flexibility to grow and adapt to changing circumstances than 
amalgamation, a system that favours larger bureaucracies, a . tendency to 
centralize and less flexibility to adapt. 
2. THE RET-WAR PERICD 
In the closing years of World War II the Manitoba governrnent, in carmon 
with many other governments, established a Committee on Post-War 
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Reconstruction. '!his Cormnittee consisted of the Deputy Ministers of Treasury, 
Mines and Natural Resources and Municipal Affairs. At times the Hon. ]):)uglas 
Campbell, Minister of Agriculture and subsequently Premier,· joined the 
Committee when agricul~ issues vvere being discussed. Canpbell' s 
participation emphasizes the prevailing .:i:nportance of agriculture, a priority 
vmich was to persist until the election of the Roblin government in 1959. A 
further insight into the prevailing political culture can be found in the fact 
that, until the advent of the Roblin government, the Province had operated on 
a "pay as you go" basis, and had next-to-no funded debt - a situation vmich 
sounds archaic, to say the least, in these days of multi-million funded debts. 
'!his fiscal conservatism was a direct effect of the traumatic experience of 
the depression years of the 1930s. In attempting to understand the political 
culture of this period, the ~ct of the pre-war depression on all those who 
experienced it, and particularly those responsible for local and provincial 
government must not be minimized. There was a real fear that the post-war 
period would usher in a second depression and that any plans to be implemented 
in this period would require ultra-conservative fiscal management. 
For the purposes of this paper the :rrost significant results of the work of 
the Cormnittee vvere proposals for a netJ::opolitan planning agency for Greater 
Winnipeg. It is interesting to note that in 1943, when the Carrmittee decided 
to proceed with the idea of metJ::opolitan planning, one of the members of the 
Cormnittee, Murray Fisher, the Deputy Minister of Municipal .Affairs, made a 
marginal notation on his agenda concerning the problem of handling the capital 
indebtedness of the individual municipalities "when the inevitable 
a:rrelga:rration took place" - an event vmich did not occur for SClrl1E! 30 years! 3 
In addition to the members of the Cormnittee, two members of the faculty of 
the University of Manitoba, Milton J. Osborne, an architect, and W.J. Waines, 
an economist, acted as staff advisors and drafted the merrorandum vmich 
discussed the need for both netJ::opolitan planning and metropolitan government. 
A comparison of the first and final drafts of this document show how it was 
influenced by the current political culture; the initial draft clearly 
indicated the need for a unified organization for the administration of public 
services in the metropolitan area, while the final version which was released 
5 
for discussion did not advocate a metropolitan fonn of government but proposed 
a study of the metropolitan problem and e£I!Pbasized that participation in the 
study would not commit anyone to accept the conclusions that would be reached. 
References to organization and administration and to the possibility of 
amalgamation as an alternative method of solving the. problems of 
administration which appeared in the first draft did not appear in the final 
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verslon. 
Although the group of senior provincial officials who carrprised the 
Committee saw the need for refonn:i.ng local government in Winnipeg to face the 
challenges of the future, their final statement reflected the cautious 
conservatism of the day and advocated study without committment and the use of 
gentle persuasion. The IIIE!ITOrandum was circulated anong the rmmicipalities in 
Greater Winnipeg and they -were invited to meet with the Committee to discuss 
it. 
Reflecting on this period some 30 years later, Dr. Waines ccmnented: 
The developnent of the IIlE!ITDrandum represents not only the reactions of 
the members of our Carrmittee, but also reactions of some aldennen and 
councillors whom I consulted from time to time. For example, AldentBn 
~ of St. Boniface was of great assistance. He believed in 
rmmicipal co-operation and was sensitive to political realities. One of 
the problems was the fear on the part of the other rmmicipalities that 
[with] any kind of reorganization or even co-operative effort; Winnipeg 
would dominate them. Hebert was quite conscious of this fear but did 
not personally accept it as fact. I think he felt that St. Boniface 
could handle itself. Iri any case he saw great benefits to each 
rmmicipality singly and together in co-operative planning. AldentBn 
Jacob Penner, later on, was a great help in persuading Winnipeg to come 
along with the project.S 
At a meeting in October 1943, eleven rmmicipalities attended and accepted 
the idea of metropolitan planning. 6 It was decided to fonn a Mei::Lq?Olitan 
Pl arming Ccmnittee with two representatives from each of the participating 
rmmicipalities. Any fonn of representation by population was considered to be 
inappropriate for planning and equal representation persisted throughout the 
life of the Commission. 
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Although Dr. Wa:ines and Ralph Pearson, the Deputy PI:ov:incial Treasurer, 
represented the provincial government at the initial meetings, the PI:ov:ince 
rrade it clear that it expected the Planning Corrmittee to be self-sustaining. 
The PI:ov:ince contributed $2,800 to the initial budget of the Conmittee. The 
balance of the $14,000 budget was shared among the participating 
:rrnmicipalities on a per capita basis. 
In 1944 the Metropolitan Planning Conmittee fonned a Joint Executive 
Conmittee with the Town Planning Conmission of the City of Winnipeg, "Which had 
been established in May 1944. The Winnipeg Conmission and the Metropolitan 
Conmittee agreed to share staff and to work. in close co-operation. The 
Executive Conmittee appointed Eric Thrift, a local architect who had been 
involved in the work of the Provincial Conmittee on Post-War Reconstruction, 
as Director, a position be held until 1959. 
In addition to Dr. Wa:ines, Alderman Penner of Winnipeg, Alderman Hebert of 
St. Boniface and Mr. Cecil E. Joslyn, a member appointed by Winnipeg, fonned a 
Joint Executive Conmittee. It was the political skill, tact and diplomacy of 
these men, supported by the Director, Eric Thrift, that held together the 
loosely knit co-operative association of very diverse :rrnmicipalities. 
In 1944, Mr. Earl 0. Mills of St. IDuis, Missouri, was appointed consultant 
to the Metropolitan Planning Conmittee for the preparation of the Master Plan. 
One of the first things that Mills did on his appoin:bnent was to errpbasize the 
.i:mp::>rtance of the participation of in:fonned and concerned citizens in the 
plan-making process. In a circular letter sent to organizations and 
individuals, Dr. Wa:ines, as Chainnan of the Joint Executive Conmittee, asked 
for names of citizens to serve on eight conmittees "Which would assist with the 
planning tasks. These were: 
1. Economic developnent 
2. Streets, highways and traffic, including local transit and 
transportation by rail, water, rrotor and air 
3. Parks, recreation and schools 
4. Housing and neighbourhood developnent 
5. Zoning 
6. Public buildings, institutions and city appearance 
7. Urban land problems and tax delinquent land 
8. IDng-range public works, program and budget. 
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In his letter, Dr. Waines carrmented: "Mr. Mills has suggested, and we fully 
agree, that the citizens of Winnipeg should be given every opportunity of 
expressing their ideas and suggestions for the benefit of the planning 
officials." 
This letter written in 1944, with its advocacy of citizen participation and 
of a carrprehensive planning program, has a very contemporary sound. Citizen 
participation as it was practiced at that time was forthcoming and during the 
period 1945-50 same 200 citizens, selected because of their expertise and 
interest, participated in the work of the committees. Today' s advocates of 
citizen participation may wish to criticize this exercise in involvement on 
the grounds that it was structured and selective; only those. citizens with 
lmown expertise or interest were invited to participate and implications of 
"elite-ism" can be made. However, even to contemporary eyes the plans that 
they produced are of a very good quality and had greater inp:ict on the growth 
of the metropolitan community than might be expected for a document which was 
to be essentially advisory. A number of its provisions such as metropolitan 
thoroughfares and general distribution of land-use provided the foundation for 
subsequent planning by Metro and Unicity. 
In 1949 the Metropolitan Planning Commission of Greater Winnipeg (MPC) was 
established by provincial legislation. The MPC had two roles: to prepare the 
Metropolitan Master Plan and revise it when necessary; and, to provide 
professional planning advice to the member rrnmicipalities on their local 
planning problems and on the metropolitan .irnplications of these local 
problems. Although the Joint Executive Ccmnittee was not incorporated into 
the structure established by legislation, liaison with the City of Winnipeg 
'lbwn Planning Ccmnission was ensured by there being four members of the 
Winnipeg Ccmnission on the MPC and by the sharing of professional and 
technical staff. The co-ordinating function of the MPC was also subsequently 
strengthened by representation from other metropolitan agencies, namely the 
Greater Winnipeg Transit Ccmnission, the Greater Winnipeg Water and Sanitary 
Districts and subsequently, the Errergency Measures Organization of Greater 
Winnipeg. 
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3. ~CIP.AL Cl'fo1MI'I"lliE - 1951 
The most significant next step in the 1950s was the fonnation of the 
Provincial-Municipal Committee in 1951 and in particular the :report of its 
exploratory subcommittee on Organization of IDeal Gove:r::nment Services in the 
Greater Winnipeg m:ea. The membership of this subcamrnittee which was under 
the chairmanship of Aldenn:m C.E. S.im:mite of the City of Winnipeg, carrprised 
Elswocxi F. :Bole, fonner mayor of the munici:pality of St. Vital; P. F. C. Byers 
who was then Secretary-Treasurer, City of East Kildonan; Murray Fisher, Q.C., 
Deputy Minister of Municipal Affairs; and, W.C. Lorimer who was then the 
.Adrn.i.nistrati ve Assistant for the School District of Winnipeg. 
The subcommittee net a number of times between 1951 and 1953 and produced a 
report which reviewed the situation in Metropolitan Winnipeg, discussed 
similar problems elsewhere in Canada, particularly in Montreal, Ottawa and 
'Ibronto, nentioned what was already being done by way of co-ordination of 
netropolitan services, discussed the use of ad hoc boaids ·and camrnissions and 
reviewed the possibility of extending this nethod to other services. 
The report of the subcamrnittee then went on to stress the need for co-
ordination within the netropolitan m:ea and to discuss ho;;r this could be 
achieved. The alternatives that it presented are worth summarizing. 
First, the entire m:ea could be a:rmlgarrated into a political unit. The 
subcamrnittee did not favour this as "judging from the experience of easte:rn 
cities where such action has been carried out it appears likely that it will 
bring a sharp increase in costs without a carrmensurate increase in the 
ben f . .·ved 7 e lts recel . " 
Second, the camrnittee discussed whether the concept of special-purpose 
boaids and commissions should be extended with the establishment of a town 
planning and zoning board which would have representation from all 
municipalities and would have mmdato:r:y pc:mers over such matters as "location 
of highways, streets, savers and water facilities, parks, zoning, etc. within 
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the area of its jurisdiction." The subcorrmittee also opposed this idea on the 
grounds that overall co-ordination .of effort would not be fully achieved as 
long as there existed a number of independent boa:rds each having full 
authority over same specific metrop:Jlitan service. 
'Ihil:d, the subcorrmittee favour:ed the establishment of a single metrop:Jlitan 
board which would supercede all existing metropolitan boa:rds and cOn:missions 
and be reSp:Jnsible for all services now being administered by these bodies 
together with any other services which might in future be organized on a 
metrop:Jlitan basis. 
Participa.tion in the board would be mandatory for all nnmicipa.lities as 
defined as being within the metropolitan area and any order prarulgated 
by the board would be binding UPJTI the nnmicipa.lities concerned although 
provisions would exist for appeals. The board would have the power to 
irrpose levies on the rrn:micipa.lities within its jurisdiction thus 
ensuring an equitable distribution of costs of services. The board 
would also be authorized to borrow •.. broadly speaking the metrop:Jlitan 
board would have complete jurisdiction over all services which are of 
metrop:Jlitan concern and would have all financial and . administrative 
powers necessary to discharge its reSp:Jnsibility fully.8 
The subcorrmi ttee went on to outline a method of representation on the 
metrop:Jlitan board which would be based on "the assessment and population of 
respective rrn:micipa.lities." It also recorrmended that provision should be made 
at the outset for increasing the representation and/or the voting power of any 
nnmicipa.lity according to the growth of its assessment and p:Jpulation. It is 
interesting to note that the use of assesSJIED.t in addition to p:Jpulation as a 
basis for representation was not applied in an;y of the subsequent 
reorganizations of local government. It should also be noted that the 
subcormnittee was primarily concerned with the provision of services. 
Contemp:>rary concern for the p:Jlitical role and for pa.rticipa.tory democracy 
was not reflected in the thinking of that day. 
The subcorrmittee laid pa.rticular stress on the need for planning both in 
the metrop:Jlitan area and in the remainder of the province. .Again the 
subcorrmittee was the only group a.nong those who rep:Jrted on metrop:Jlitan 
problems during the period under study who stressed the need for a 
corresp:Jnding level of planning outside the metrop:Jlitan area. It is ironical 
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to note that it took sarre twenty years before the provincial gover:rment 
decided to undertake a planning study of the region that surrounds 
metropolitan Winnipeg. Though written in 1953, the sub-carrmittee' s conce:r:n 
for this aspect of planning is still relevant: 
Aside from the need for a provincial planning authority to safeguard the 
metropolitan area against hannful action or inaction by adjacent 
municipalities, the fact is that such an authority could prove a 
substantial benefit to a great many organized municipalities throughout 
the Province. Through a lack of proper planning a number of 
municipalities even now are labouring under considerable 
disadvantages .... Housing and other developrents are being carried out on 
the outskirts of incorporated urban municipalities leading to the 
creation of traffic hazards and usually an undesirable "fringe" 
settlement which contributes little or nothing to municipal finance but 
expects to participate equally in fire, police, school . and other 
services maintained by the municipalities. 9 
'Ihe subcarrmittee also had sarretbing to say about amalganating certain of 
the metropolitan municipalities whose tax base was inadequate to p:rovide these 
services which should be available in an urban area. It also carrmented on 
situations where there was a great disparity in the wealth and tax revenues of 
municipalities. .Amalgamation would result in a IIDre equitable sharing of 
revenues and costs in these instances. 
Where a very large finn or fi:rms established itself in a small 
numicipality with the consequence that its errployees live in a adjoining 
municipality where adequate residential, school, shopping and other 
facilities are available. In these situations substantial inequity 
results fran the fact that the municipality in which the finn locates 
obtains all the tax revenue while the adjoining municipalities receive 
no such revenue but are burdened by the errployees' demand for 
services.lO 
'Ihe carrmittee -went on to point out that this was not a hypothet:;ical situation· 
but actually existed in the metropolitan area and in fact continued to exist 
until complete amalgamation into Unicity Winnipeg in 1971. 
Finally, the subcarrmittee pointed out that, "it must be recognized, 
however, that the solutions proposed herein may becarre outdated by events or 
may in practice prove less successful than presently anticipated ... ll It -went 
on to recammend a regular review at say, ten :yearly intervals. "Such a review 
would constitute a logical compliment to the work of the subcarrmittee and 
would be part of that derrocratic evolutionary process by which we adjust a 
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gover.rmental institution to changed times and circumstances. " 'lhe idea of 
periodic revie;.v was incorporated into subsequent refonns, and is general in 
refonn legislation across Canada. Continuous revie;.v and adjustment has never 
been fonnally prop::>sed even though, in practice, minor legislative adjustments 
are made frequently. It is suggested that continuous review, preferably 
carried out by an external "audit" agency with the power to .irrplement vested 
in the local gover.rment itself, would enable more effective adaptation to 
change and would prevent the "crisis" atrrosphere that frequently attends the 
hearings of a revie;.v carrmission - with the associated opportunity for 
p::>litical "grandstanding. " 
Reading the subcarrmittee rep::>rt with the wisdom of hindsight, one is 
tempted to question why it was necessary to wait for some seven years and the 
rep::>rt of another investigating group before taking action to alleviate the 
situation that existed in Metrop::>litan Winnipeg, and that the subccmnittee so 
clearly described. However, although "in all the world there· is no greater 
force than an idea 'Whose tine has come," the idea ImlSt wait for the tine. 
4. CD.1MEN'.rARY AND INAIDATIOO - 'lEE :MElR()E(l[.ITA P.IANNllG 
aHfiSSIOO OF GREATER WINNIPEG 
In revievving the planning of this period it is essential to keep in mind 
the "state of the art" in the early 1950s. 'lhe "civic refonn" viewpoint still 
prevailed, that planning should be kept free from the taint of day-to-day 
p::>litics and that citizen participation should be structured and selective. 
The :m:::x:xi of the period was cautious optimism. The anticipated p::>st-war 
depression had not occurred and civic leaders found themselves in the 
encouraging p::>sition of being able to look forward to a near future 'When the 
building of a better world might became far more than p::>litical rhetoric. 'lhe 
urban problems of the late 1960s were not yet appa:rent - or apparent only to a 
discerning few 'Who tended to be regarded as Jeremiahs in a period 'Which 
seemed, at last, to be the beginning of better tines to come. 
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Over the decade of the life of the Metropolitan Planning Ccmnission, there 
was no shortage of metropolitan planning - the weaknesses lay in the 
i:DplaiBitati.an of the plans. It was believed that, if plans were prepared by 
a group of numicipalities sharing a ccmnon interest in the g:rowth of a 
metropolitan area, then implerrentation "WOuld be inevitable. Tbis proved to be 
a naive assumption. 
instances where the 
However, the co-operative approach did "WOrk in those 
enlightened self-interest of a group of member 
nnmicipalities coincided. This can be seen in the developrent of parts of the 
rna jor thoroughfare system which, though it had deficiencies, did provide a 
sound basis for the subsequent "WOrk of the Metropolitan gove:r::mrent. The 
results of co-operation were also apparent in a reasonably standard system of 
land-use control developed over the years by the MPC staff enacted in a series 
of individual nnmicipal zoning by-laws. 
The co-operative approach did not "WOrk, however, when large,_ expensive 
public "WOrks such as new- river crossings or savage treatment "WOrks, were 
needed but where the sharing of cost arcong the metropolitan municipalities, or 
arcong a group of them who "WOuld benefit II!Ost directly, was dependent on co-
operative decisions. 
Tbis was not surprising; not only was this. the result of nnmicipal 
unwillingness to face up to the fiscal inq;>lications of metropolitan planning 
as same critics have suggested, but also the municipal politicians saw their 
prime mandate as the provision of nnmicipal services within their own 
boundaries. This was what they were elected to do. Apart from the 
contributions to the cost of the MPC' s operations, a large part of which was 
justified, in their view-, by professional services received for local planning 
problems, there was little left in the nnmicipal budget for the secondary goal 
of implerrenting metropolitan plans, particularly when those plans "WOuld result 
in no i.muEdiate and visible advantage to the nrunicipality concerned. 
One example of the problem of attempting to implerrent metropolitan plans on 
a co-operative basis will suffice. In 1953 the Metropolitan Planning 
Corrmission in association with the provincial gove:r::mrent decided that a 
traffic and transit survey of Metropolitan Winnipeg should be undertaken. 
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An extensive study was carried out and a very large number of 
recorrmendations were presented. Both the provincial government and the local 
governments comprising the merribership of the Metropolitan Planning Carmnission 
praised the quality and appropria:teness of the recorrmendations. However, only 
those dealing with traffic and parking in the central area of the City of 
Winnipeg were .implemented because the responsibility for them lay solely 
within one local jurisdiction, and no major capital works -were involved . 
.Another continuing problem, voluntary participcltion in the worlc of the MPC, 
should be mentioned. Even in 1953 -when the author joined the staff of the 
Metropolitan Planning Corrmission, the beginning of the year was still a tiine 
of crisis, when all of the skills of the leaders of the group were necessary 
to persuade the nnmicipcll merribers to continue to participclte and share the 
cost for another year. This year-to-year existence did not, however, seem to 
inhibit the Metropolitan Planning Carmnission's ability to take a long planning 
perspective or to produce, by 1950, what was probably the first and one of the 
very few, Metropolitan Master Plans in North America. 
The Manitoba Planning Act provided that any nnmicipcllity that wished to 
plan - mandatory planning both in Manitoba and in other provinces is 
relatively recent - must appoint a Town Planning Carmnission with a majority of 
lay merribers. It is in the work of the MPC with many of these local 
Carmnissions that substantial achievement can be seen. The Annual Reports of 
the MPC show that land-use controls -were developed and .improved, sub:livision 
design was advanced from the standard grid to other contemporary pcltterns 
including developne:nts of Clarence Stein's super-block. In fact one of the 
rrost complete and successful applications of super-block principles in North 
.America can be seen in Winnipeg at Wildewood, in the former suburb of Fort 
Garry. School and park planning was also advanced and the true nature of 
camprehensi ve local and metropolitan planning was battled out in a series of 
late night Carmnission meetings of the kind familiar to anyone active in 
planning in the 1950s. 
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Although in theory the Commissions ·-were not intended to be {X)litical, their 
role as a training ground for local {X)litics - and as a means of keeping out-
of-office {X)liticians in touch - should not be over-looked. .Although the 
Ccmnission was intended as a device to protect planning from the "taint of 
{X)li tics, 11 the {X)litical role of local government could not be denied. Not 
only were the actions of the Commissions part of the total {X)litical process 
but often citizen members of Commissions subsequently ran for office in local 
and provincial elections. Furtherrrore, it was through the discussions in the 
MPC and in the local Ccmnissions that the need for same fonn of metro{X)litan 
government was articulated. Gradually over the decade of the 1950s, the 
limitations of co-operation, and the growing urgency of the unresolved 
metro{X)litan issues related to both the scope and the rate of growth, forced a 
realization that same fonn of metro{X)litan government IIRlSt be provided. 
'lb sl.ID:IIBrize the situation that prevailed towards the end of the 1950s, the 
majority of those involved or concerned with local government in Winnipeg were 
earning to the realization that there was a need for same fonn of metro{X)litan 
government. Services which could be provided better on a metro{X)litan basis 
could be identified. The need was acknowledged to provide a {X)litical 
decision-making system with boundaries co-te:r:minus with the metro{X)litan area. 
Co-ordination was necessary for those services which, while remaining 
primarily the res{X)nsibilities of the rrnmicipalities, did have certain aspects 
or irrplications which -were metro{X)litan in nature . 
.Although not a de facto government, the MPC in exercising its own 
reS{X)nsibilities and through influence on the other metro{X)litan special-
purpose agencies, was a component in the local government system and can, 
therefore, be evaluated accor:ding to the criteria described in the 
11 Introduction. 11 
It was efficient in that it supplied both metro{X)litan and local planning 
advice with a very small staff. Efficiency was ensured by the nature of its 
funding system. Municipalities usually based their continuing. financial 
support on the perceived value of services received in the previous year. The 
notable exception was the City of Winnipeg, which provided the foundation 
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support for the MPC throughout its life. This consistent support is very Imlch 
to the credit of the succession of aldermanic. and lay nanbers who represented 
Winnipeg on the MPC. 
It was reasonably :r:espansive in that the membership of MPC and its close 
working connection with nost of the nnmicipal planning carmnissions provided a 
wide spectrum of opinion. 
In ccmnenting on the lack of openness and representation, it should be 
pointed out that this was a criticism of local goverrunent generally at that 
time. As has been indicated in the preceding discussion, leader:ship was 
exercised, particular! y in identifying and articulating the need for local 
goverrunent refonn. 
Flexihll i:ty is evidenced in the variety of physical designs that the .MPC 
produced in response to differing local conditions and influences; it can 
also be seen in the evolution of the MPCs approach to planning and how it 
responded to new ideas and to change. Even with a small budget, funds were 
found to allow members and staff to attend out-of-town meetings and 
conferences in order to keep up with changes in planning thinking. The MPC 
also played a role in the developnent of planning in Canada and the 
involvement of its Director, Eric Thrift, in the establishment of the 
Carrmunity Planning Association of Canada and the post-war revival of the 'lbwn. 
Planning Institute of Canada should be ac1mowledged. While receiving the 
benefit of close association with the developnent of Canadian planning, a 
corresponding contribution was :rrade. 
Carmnmity planning is a strange activity, both in the political and the 
professional sense. The planner often has difficulty in identifying for the 
layman the value and successes of the activity. Unlike other professions, 
there is no readily accepted measure of success, or failure for that :rratter . 
.Although past situations can be used to illustrate what happens without 
planning, direct comparison is difficult. This is not an argmnent identifying 
the problems of planning, but rather to support the view that continuing 
cxmnitoent on behalf of both political and professional participants is 
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essential if the activity is to be successful. The reco:r:d of achievement of 
the MPC, both in plarming itself and in making the case for local gove:r::nment 
refo:rrn is evidence of strong and continuing ccmnit:roent. 
5. THE GREATER WINNI:PEG INVESTIGATDG · CD1MTSSirn - 1955 
Following the presentation of the. report of the subcormnittee on 
organization of IDeal Government Services in the Greater Winni~ Area, there 
was an abortive attempt to fo:rrn a metropolitan exploratory corrmittee, but this 
was not successful mainly due to the inability of the corrmittee to decide how 
to finance the further work that it considered necessary. However, the need 
for local gove:r::nment refo:rrn in Metropolitan Winnipeg continued to be a lively 
topic, and in 1955 the provincial gove:r::nment appointed the Greater Winnipeg 
Investigating Carrmission. The Carrmission consisted of five representatives 
from the area municipalities and although all of those appointed to the 
Carrmission were lmown to the provincial gove:r::nment and had informal political 
connections at the provincial level, there was no identified "provincial" 
representative on the Carrmission. It seemed that the provincial gove:r::nment 
was of the opinion that reorganization of local gove:r::nment in metropolitan 
Winnipeg was essentially a local problem to be resolved by local people. The 
provincial government, by Order-in-Council, appointed a Greater Winnipeg 
Investigating Carrmission consisting of five persons whose names had been 
selected from a list sutmitted by municipalities. The :rranbers were as 
follows: 
a) J.L. Brodie - fonner Mayor of .East Kildonan, became 
Chai:r:man 
b) J .G. Van Beleghem - Mayor of St. Boniface 
c) Thomas Findlay - Mayor of St. Janes 
d) C.M. Kushner, Q.C. - then a councillor and subsequent! y Mayor 
of West Kildonan 
e) George E. Sharpe - Mayor of the City of Winnipeg. 
The Carrmission was given b:road tenus of reference to look into the whole 
field of relevant facts, matters, issues and legislation relating to the 
municipal, inter-municipal and public school government administration of the 
cities of Winnipeg and St. Boniface and the existing or potential urban areas 
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of any adjacent rrnmicipalities which in the opinion of the Carrmission had or 
may have had certain interests and responsibilities in carrmon. 'Ihe Order-in-
Council further clarified the responsibilities of the Carrmission by 
instructing them to make findings and recommendations with respect to 
the geographical definition of the area which no;.;r or in future should 
comprise the Metropolitan urban area of Greater Winnipeg •.. whether it 
"WOuld be advisable to have all or aey munici:pal, inter-rrnmicipal or 
public school units governments in the metropolitan area amalgamated or 
their l:xmndaries altered. ... whether it "WOuld be advisable to establish 
same form of metropolitan government ... and if same such metropolitan 
authority is approved by the Carrmission, to make recommendations as to 
the subject matter of which the authority should have jurisdiction and 
the extent of such jurisdiction, the composition of the gove:r:ning body 
of the authority, the manner of appointing or electing the members of 
governing l:x:xlies, their terms of office and the representation on the 
governing body of the component rrnmici:palities and school districts in 
the metropolitan area, whether municipal services should be the 
responsibility of such metropolitan authority, the method of 
proportioning the costs among the municipal units within the 
metropolitan area, the :power of the metropolitan authority to borrow 
noney, issue debentures and make levies against the municipalities or 
property within the metropolitan area.l2 
'Ihe Order-in-conncil further indicated that 
if the carrmission decides against recommending amalgamation ... or against 
the establishing of any form of metropolitan government in the 
metropolitan area, to make such recommendations as would, in its 
opllllon, provide better co-ordination and efficiency in the 
administration of rrnmicipal, inter-municipal and public school services 
carnrron to or desirable for the rrnmici:palities in the school districts of 
the proposed metropolitan area and provide better local government for 
the citizens of the metropolitan area.l3 
'Ihe Carrmission was also instructed to draft any necessary legislation and was 
given what seems, in contemporary tenns, a nodest budget of $15,000 to carry 
out its 'WOrk. 
In the course of its examination the Carrmission travelled in Great Britain 
and Europe and also in Canada and the United States. It :paid particular 
attention to the recently fonned metropolitan government in 'Ibronto. In 
addition to holding fonnal public hearings in Winnipeg, there was considerable 
infonnal consultation with Jmo;.;rledgeable people in the Winnipeg metropolitan 
area and other places, notably in 'Ibronto. 
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In its list of ackno;vledgements the Carrmission mentions particularly the 
co-operation received by the two daily papers, the Winnipeg Free Press and the 
Wllm.ipeg T:r:ibme. These two newspapers provided excellent coverage of the 
vvork of the Carrmission and ensured that there was no lack of infonnation. The 
news stories and the editorial pages of both newspapers gave frequent coverage 
to the need for re-organization of local government. In particular, a series 
of editorial articles by .Arthur Fletcher of the WiunjraJ FLee P:ress was 
republished by that newspaper in a parrphlet entitled Greater Winnipeg - How 
Shall it Grow. 
In addition to receiving a substantial volume of data from many sources, 
the Carrmission appointed its own Director of Research, Dr. Ruben Bellan of the 
Depart::rrent of Economics, University of Manitoba, who, with the help of the 
snall staff, was responsible for the data collection and research which fo:aned 
the basis of the Report. 
In the "Foreword" to its Report:, the Carrmission developed the case for 
metropolitan government, quoting a mnnber of .American references· and a fewer 
number of Canadian sources. It should be remembered that the deliberations of 
the Carrmission took place during a decade when the movement for metropolitan 
government was particularly strong in the United States and before the 
difficulties, if not the impossibilities, of adopting this government refonn 
in the majority of US cases bad been realized. The Carrmission mentioned that 
it attended the first National Conference on Metropolitan Problems, held in 
the United States at East lansing, Michigan. 
Nor did the Carrmission rely entirely on conterrporary references to develop 
the case for metropolitan government. It found an appropriate quotation from 
the prophet Isaiah (chapter 5, verse 8) , "vvoe unto them that join house to 
house, that lay field to field till there be no place that they may be placed 
alone in the midst of the earth. " 
Having first traced the growth of metropolitan Winnipeg from the very early 
fur trading days to 1955, the Carrmission then summarized the economic 
prospects of the carmnmity. In a forecast of same accuracy, it saw no 
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significant increase in value of grain bandl i ng. It also foresaw the decline 
of the value of work carried out in local railway :repair shops and the 
unlikelihood of any expansion in the value of aircraft :repair and overhaul 
work carried out in Winnipeg by TCA. (now Air Canada). In a no:re positive vein 
it forecast a beneficial effect on Winnipeg's econ~· by the completion of the 
St. I.aw.rence Seaway, some growth in the manufacturing of clothing, foodstuffs, 
furniture and housewares, and the continued growth of Winnipeg's financial 
institutions 'Which predominately served western Canada. 
The Order-in-Council establishing the Ccmnission did not define the basis 
of the need for the inqu.ir_y, but merely stated in its preamble that such an 
inquiry was deemed to be in the public interest. So one has to look to the 
Report of the Carrmission itself for discussion of the need for reorganization. 
The carrmission stressed that "the speed and direction of Winnipeg's 
economic grc:wth would be heavily effected by governmental policies and 
economic trends, none of 'Which can be predicted with assurance"14 and stressed 
that the prosperity and growth of Greater Winnipeg was closely tied to that of 
Western Canada as a whole. A separate chapter was provided in the 
Carrmission' s Report dealing with the history of local government in Greater 
Winnipeg and this was followed by a similar history of the develop:nent of the 
school districts. The current operations of the municipalities and the school 
districts were analyzed statistically, as was the provision of the municipal 
welfare services. Although the Report discussed in some detail certain local 
services such as engineering, protection to persons and property, assessment 
and recreation, no specific mention is made of planning. 
In discussing the provision of hydroelectric p::mer, the Carrmission pointed 
out the problem inherent in the prevailing arrangement by 'Which the Manitoba 
Power Carrmission supplied the Province of Manitoba including the suburban 
municipalities with the exception of the City of Winnipeg; the City of 
Winnipeg having its own hydroelectric supply and distribution system. 
Although there was co-operation between the two systems, this separation of 
what should logically have been one hydroelectric supply system for the entire 
metropolitan area had caused serious problems. The carrmission's RePOrt also 
20 
discussed at same length the cooperative inter-rrnmicipal arrangements that had 
been developed over the years. 
Municipal expenditures and :torrowing were examined in same detail and the 
final sections of the Report discussed present and future problems. Bearing 
in mind the significance of the report of the Investigating Carrmission - it 
documented the need for refonn and provided strong recorrmendations backed by 
the experience and prestige of the ccmnissioners, all of whom held senior 
elected office. 
The concluding part of the Report dealt with anticipa.ted problems and 
discussed the need for inter:nnmicipal co-operation, not only co-operation 
between differing rrnmicipalities but a 11 CO-o:r:dinated effort on the part of the 
administrators of all public services. II Each public service was considered to 
be 11 complex and many faceted and had ramifications which reach into and affect 
all other services. II 
Proper rrnmicipal administration in the Greater Winnipeg carmnmity 
requires a co-ordinated approach, so that each individual service is 
seen, not as unique and. independent, but as part of an overall effort to 
provide for the general well-being of the carmnmity. Failure to adopt 
such a co-ordinated approach may well result in the aggravation of 
problems as officials in charge in one public service deal with their 
problems by procedures which create so many difficulties in the 
administration of other services as to render the overall situation 
worse than before. Thus for instance, we may build broad fr:eeways to 
solve problems in traffic flow thereby bringing into being ilrpossible 
problems of downtown parking .15 
Like its predecessor the subcammittee of the Provincial-Municipal 
Carrmittee, the Ccmnission stressed the inequitable distribution of rrnmicipally 
collected revenues and pointed out that one nnmicipality might collect the 
revenues from a particular industrial or commercial enterprise while the 
services to its employees were provided by an entirely different rrnmicipality. 
It then developed the arguments supporting the view- that there was inequitable 
distribution of financial burden on rrnmicipalities in the metropolitan area. 
Major streets and bridges were singled out as an example, "one rrnmicipality 
may bear the entire cost of same facility which is freely available to 
residents of another municipality and indeed, to anyone within the 
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metropolitan area. Major streets and bridges were singled out as an exa!Il?le, 
"one nnmicipality may bear the entire cost of some facility which is freely 
available to residents of another nnmicipalit_y and indeed, to aiWO!le within 
the metropolitan area. The streets of one nnmicipality may be intensively 
used by outsiders who contribute nothing towa:rds the cost and maintenance of 
roadways and to the costs of traffic control - costs for which they are 
responsible. "16 
The Corrmission "We!lt on to point out that although the provincial gove:r:nment 
had contributed to the cost of constructing and maintaining a number of urban 
thoroughfares and bridges which fonned links in the provincial highway system, 
these contributions had always been given on an ad hoc basis rather than based 
on the tenns of a general fonnula. In other woids, in each case the 
nnmicipalities concern.ed had to negotiate with the provincial goverrnnent. The 
Corrmission also pointed out that "even with the provincial contribution, such 
construction projects had involved heavy costs for the :rm.micipalities 
concern.ed. " 
The fact that major recreation facilities such as Kildonan Park and 
Assiniboine Park were financed by the City of Winnipeg but were enjoyed by the 
whole metropolitan area, was stressed. It was also pointed out that the City 
of Winnipeg made contributions to a number of local cultural and recreational 
enterprises which benefited the whole metropolitan area. 
The inequity inherent in social welfare costs were also stressed. The 
Corrmission pointed out that the incidence of persons needing welfare was 
particular! y heavy in Winnipeg and to a lesser extent in St. Boniface. "In 
these cities, especially in the fonner 1 there exists a great number of large 
old homes which have been converted into cheap :roaming houses or divided into 
low grade suites. Families in the lowest income brackets generally seek out 
this accarrm::da.tion because it is the cheapest they can obtain. ,l? · 
In other woids, low income families and those who were in reduced 
circumstances for a wide variety of reasons, gravitated to Winnipeg and to a 
lesser degree, St. Boniface 1 because these were the only places where 
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accarrm:xia.tion that they could afford, could be found. In passing, it is as 
-well to mention that at the time that the Ccmnission was studying the 
situation, no public housing had .been built anywhere in the metro:politan 
Winnipeg area. 
The Corrmission' s Report also stated that a nurriber of nursing homes were 
concentrated in Winnipeg and St. Boniface and . these institutions catered to 
considerable numbers of older persons, many of 'Wham came from rural Manitoba 
and nay of 'Wham required some fonn of public aid. The Report acknowledged 
that increases in provincial contributions to nnmicipal -welfare costs had 
reduced the inequity but had not eliminated it entirely. 
Inequities in the sharing of costs of flood protection was a problem 
peculiar to Greater Winnipeg. The nnmicipalities bordering the Red and 
Assiniboine Rivers were responsible for the full cost of naintaining the dikes 
within their boundaries and the Report indicated that "the burden on St. Vital 
and Fort Garry is particularly heavy since both of these nnmicipalities have 
extensive Red River frontage and are obliged to build and maintain lengthy 
dykes. "18 At the time, these two rrrunicipalities were . predominately 
residential in character and suffered from an imbalance in the residential and 
the non-residential :parts of their assessment base. The Corrmission said that 
"flood waters do not pay attention to nnmicipal boundaries" and that the 
defenses naintained by the riparian rrrunicipalities benefitted those who had no 
river frontage. 
A nurriber of examples of wasteful duplication in the prov:I.slon of local 
services -were pointed out, specifically the proliferation of garbage disposal 
sites and water pumping stations. Duplication of engineering equipnent was 
also noted. 
A problem which was relatively new at the time, was discussed; the 
undesirable proximity of industry and housing. The Report stated that "this 
problem is of relatively recent origin, until about 1950 there was an ample 
supply of serviced land in nany localities in Greater Winnipeg, mostly 
serviced by sewer and water lines laid dCM!l before 1969, many of them 
23 
installed prior to 1914 - a legacy from preceding land booms. "19 Builders had 
an ample choice of lots and were "under no pressures to develop streets 
because they could be serviced nost economically 1 however unsuitable they 
might be otherwise. "20 This situation had changed and the Ccmnission 
illustrated that private developers' ability to acquire substantial blocks of 
land that could then be serviced and developed economically was the principle 
deter:minant of a location of urban growth. For example, "private enterprise 
recently developed acreage in St. Boniface [Windsor Park] despite serious 
drawbacks inherent in the site. One of the attractions was the fact that an 
area was canprised of several large parcels "Which could be purchased from the 
owners at reasonable cost; in other won:ls - that the area being in large 
parcels made the physical developnent nore economical. n 21 There were certain 
areas such as Charleswood, which, in the view of the Ccmnission, "WOuld be 
excellent residential areas but could not be developed because "the nnmicipal 
corp::>ration is too v;eaJc financially to take on large scale land servicing 1 and 
the division of land in the nUIIEIOus small individually owned properties 
rendered developnent unattractive to private enterprise."22 
The Ccmnission also pointed out that without metropolitan control of 
industrial developnent "a rrnmicipality may authorize the establishment within 
its limits of industry 'Which i.rrposes an inconvenience or cost on the residents 
of other rrnmicipalities and the latter may be unable to obtain effective 
redress o II 23 Air pollution from oil refineries and the special sewage disposal 
problems caused by the sugar refineiy in Fort Garry were quoted as examples. 
The practice of giving tax concessions in on:ier to attract industry was 
criticized, "this practice has two unfortunate consequences, it may lead to 
the erection of plants in unsuitable locations and enable large finns to 
contribute to the public revenue of the metropolitan canmunity ·less than they 
could or should." It was also observed that "it is probably unnecessary in 
nost or all cases to grant tax concessions to fi:rms to induce them to settle 
in the Greater Winnipeg area; industrial fi:rms are induced to came here by 
canpelling economic considerations such as the availability of labour, raw 
rnaterials and accessability to markets. With or without tax concessions they 
"WOuld locate sarrewhere in the Greater Winnipeg area. From the point of view 
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of the metropolitan carmnmicy, therefore, tax concessions 'WOuld not really 
attract ne;v finns to Greater Winnipeg but . instead merely enable them to pay 
lower municipal taxes than they could pay and 'WOuld pay if so required. One 
rrnmicipality gains but the area as a whole loses. "24 
\i\lhile dealing with the general topic of the control of developrent, the 
undesirability of ribbon developrent was stressed, as was the undesirability 
of "spotty, low quality developrent on the fringe of the metropolitan area." 
'Ihe problems resulting from the :maintenance of separate fire and police 
departments were mentioned, as was the fact that the City of Winnipeg's fire 
department, through a series of special agreements and arrangements, .was, in 
fact, providing a fonn of metropolitan £ire protection. ~, it was 
questionable whether the contributions paid by the other municipalities to 
Winnipeg for this service really covered an appropriate share of stand-by 
costs. 
In discussing the problems related to police protection, the Comnission 
made the distinction between the protection of persons and property and 
criminal detection 'WOrk. 'Ihe fact that crime did not respect municipal 
boundaries was stressed and that crime detection 'WOrk is specialized 
"requiring highly trained and experienced men, a small suburban :municipality 
nonnally has little need for such personnel on its police force and does not 
have them; when a major crime is carrmitted in such a municipalicy, the local 
police force may therefore deal with inadequately trained detectives. ~~ 25 'Ihe 
infonnal assistance provided by the ·City of Winnipeg was acknowledged. 
Related to police 'WOrk was the control of traffic which was fragmented, 
leading to bottlenecks and to an illogical variation in parking restrictions. 
'Ihe inability of the metropolitan area to develop a coherent system of :main 
thoroughfares was also mentioned. 'Ihere had been same co-operation in the 
provision of inter-rrnmicipal thoroughfares but it was the failure in co-
operation on street widths and traffic regulations which induced bottlenecks 
and resulted in traffic tie-ups. 
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Finally, the wide variation in the quality of library service provided 
throughout the metropolitan area was stressed, a.S was the fact that there was 
no co-ordination of effort between Winnipeg- and the suburban libraries. At 
this time, only the City of Winnipeg- provided anything like an adequate 
reference library, and this could be used by suburban residents only after the 
payment of a non-resident fee. 
In concluding its analysis of existing problems, the Corrmission quite 
properly summarized all of these under the heading "lack of an organization 
responsible for dealing with problems "'Which affect Greater Winnipeg as a 
whole, " and pointed out that "when new problems arose they were handled 
belatedly by ad-hoc organizations created by the provincial government 1 or 
through the tardy, unwilling and suspicious co-operation of municipal 
governments. "26 If these words sound somewhat harsh it should be recalled 
that the Commissioners were talking about the municipal administrations "'Which 
they were leading. 
Following the discussion of present problems 1 the Commission's Report then 
turned to prospective problems and ccmnented on the range of these resulting 
from increased growth. In discussing where this growth would be located, they 
aclmowledged that a substantial a:rrount of new population was likely to be 
accorrm:::dated in apartments in the central parts of the City of Winnipeg, thus 
increasing the resident population of the central city. "Although much of the 
new- residential and industrial growth would take place in the suburbs, this 
would not mean that the city would be unaffected. "27 The expansion of 
population in the suburbs would also render necessary the expansion of 
centrally located facilities "'Which serve the entire metropolitan area. "It 
will became necessary to enlarge hospital capacity, auditorimn space and 
downtown parking facilities; it will became necessary to build additional 
bridges across rivers, throughways in the downtown area, and to widen central 
arterial streets in order to accorrm:::date increased traffic flow to and from 
the expanding [sub]urban areas. •• 28 
An unusual but interesting group of observations was made under the 
heading, "The Mistakes Which May Be Made." The Report warned that these could 
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result in excessive costs, great inconvenience or the inequitable distribution 
of financial bun:lens arrongst the members of the rnetrppolitan comrrnmity. In 
addition to the mistakes based on forecasting errors or failure to res:pond to 
what the Commission described as reasonable anticipa.tions, "the mistakes may 
be made in a consequence of the fact that the authorities res:ponsible for 
develop:nent are lacking in experience or are financially restricted. Mistakes 
may be made because one individual small group manages to piC!IIDte its private 
interests to the detriment of the ccmmmity as a whole. "29 Specifically, the 
problems attendant on undesirable fringe developrent, the excessive 
installation of septic tanks and unsuitable location of indust.J::y and housing, 
were discussed. The problems resulting fran the construction of public 
facilities of inadequate capa.city and fran developing in uneconomic sequence 
were mentioned. In discussing this group of problems, the Commission made an 
observation which though quite realistic at the time, now sounds a little 
unreal; it discussed the problems resulting fran serviced land lying 
undeveloped and accumulating heavy interest charges with no corres:ponding 
benefit being yielded. 
As an urban area grows some of the services which are provided by suburban 
municipa.lities at low cost, or which are not provided at all, have to be 
improved or must be provided in new- ways at a higher· cost. Garbage dis:posal 
and the dis:posal of sanitary sewage are examples, although this concern v;ould 
be applicable to alm::>st any municipal service. It is also interesting to note 
that the Commission commented on the probability of the need for new- services, 
pa.rticularly in the social welfare field. For example, it carrmented on the 
fact that "there may be few- reta.:r:ded children in a small comrrnmity and nothing 
is done for them since their number may be too small to justify the 
establishment of a special institution for them; as the carrmunity grows, 
hCJ'irJeVer, the number of such children will be corresponcli.ngly larger until the 
time comes when there are enough such children to justify the organization of 
special services for them. "30 
Although criteria were not specified, the desirability of "efficient" 
services occurs frequently in the discussion, as does the need for true 
"econCJir¥. " In a number of cases there is an oblique reference to the question 
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of quality of services and, particularly in the :paragraphs dealing with 
education, there is a clear indication that the Ccmnission was concerned, as 
has been mentioned, with social problems such as the need for adequate 
specialized education for Children with particular learning problems. 
To the contemporary reader this discussion ·of present and future problems 
is lacking in two obvious ways. First, there is no mention of public 
participation in the affairs of local government, and, as has been said 
before, the lack of concern for this is an accurate reflection of the 
prevailing attitudes at the time the Reoort was written. . The second 
deficiency is, however 1 more serious because it indicates a deficiency in 
thinking of the Ccmnission. There is no specific reference to ·the need for 
m-arrlina:ted cx:::up::ehensive pl anni:ng for the provision of public services and 
for the control of capital borrowing. It is true that throughout the Report 
there are many oblique references to co-o:rrlinated planning but for same 
reason, the vvo:r:d "planning" is rarely used. The vvo:r:d is only used as a sub-
heading in a section dealing with "Construction of Public Works" where there 
is a brief discussion of the need for an overall infrastructure· plan. 
This deficiency ma.y be due, in part, to the prevailing view that planning 
was primarily concerned with the preparation and administration of regulations 
to control the use of lands and buildings through zoning, and with the 
physical design of residential areas and the location of rights-of-way for new 
services and facilities. Planning as a co-o:rrlinating and integrating activity 
was not clearly understood nor was the contemporax:y· viav of planning as the 
management of an ongoing process of ·urban change generally accepted. 
As has been mentioned earlier, the Metropolitan Planning Carrmission had 
provided a forum for the discussion of the need for a level of government to 
llr!Plement metropolitan plans. Its function as provider of professional 
planning advice to the member nrunicipalities was also understood and valued. 
The lack of detailed discussion of planning function ma.y have resulted from a 
view that it was 1Nell taken care of by the existing arrangements, and that all 
that was necessary was to include the Planning Ccmnission in the list of 
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special-purpose Boa:r:ds and Corrmissions "Whose functions were to be taken over 
by a metropolitan council. 
It nay be appropriate to carrment here that .in the author's experience the 
Ccmnission' s somewhat limited view of planning carried over to the follow:ing 
decade of metropolitan government, and certainly in the earlier days of that 
govermnent there was resistance to the idea that planning really was sanething 
far broader than preparing zoning by-laws and designing sub-divisions. In 
retrospect, it can be said that the central position of fiscal planning and 
its direct relationship to the planning of physical and social services was 
never clearly articulated and understocxi. 
Having corrmented on the lack of discussion of public :participation in the 
affairs of local govermnent, there is an interestfug passing reference in the 
subsequent section of the Ccmnission's Report dealing with "The .Alternatives 
Available. " "IDeal govermnent should provide. public services efficient! y, but 
efficiency is not the sole objective. The services provided must be those 
which the people "Wallt" 31 (emphasis added) . "Mere efficiency .in the provision 
of public services is of little merit if the public does not want the service. 
The capacity of assess "What the public wants is at least as i.mp:>rtant as the 
capacity to serve those wants effectively."32 Subsequent observations seem to 
indicate that the capacity to assess "What the public wants would be adequately 
se:rved by "attracting worthy and able people into public life. " 
"While stating that "a system of local govermnent must be judged by a broad 
variety of criteria, " it is unfortunate that the Ccmnission did not attempt to 
be specific about these criteria. Had they done so, an interesting comparison 
could have been :rrade between their criteria and tb.ose "Which have subsequently 
been defined in other reports. 
Under the heading "The Construction of Public Works, " there is a brief 
discussion of the financing of these services. The point is :rrade, once again, 
that necessary public works such as bridges or sewage treatJ:rent facilities had 
been delayed because of the difficulties of arranging an equitable 
distribution of cost. These problems would, of course, disappear if the 
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responsibility for providing these rna.jor services :were transferred to same 
fonn of metropolitan authority. The Commission saw merit in centralizing fire 
and police protection services, services related to public welfare and public 
health, also the inspection of buildings. They. were not convinced that 
garbage collection should be centralized but :were of the view that garbage 
disposal should be. Snowplowing was seen to be substantially a local 
responsibility as was street cleaning and maintenance. Pa:r::ks and libraries 
were seen to benefit from centralization, as was the assessment of properties 
for local tax purposes. 
In surrmarizing the case for a metropolitan administration, the Commission 
considered that a larger administrative unit 'WOuld be able to employ 
specialized personnel and equiprent, and important economies of scale would be 
achieved. Effective co-ordination was seen to be the result of centralizing 
major services in a single authority and the nore equitable distribution of 
the costs of these services was considered to be one ·of the advantages. 
In presenting the counter argument 1 the Commission stated that 
centralization of administration reuoves it further from the citizens being 
served. .Administration in a small nnmicipality is likely to be nore flexible 
and nore responsive to the demands and carrplaints of citizens; people can 
cormnmicate directly with the person in authority who can deal with the 
problem himself. In a large nnmicipality, citizens who wished to register 
desires or grievances can generally only approach subordinates, or may get 
lost in a maze of red tape. The officials of large organizations are bound by 
rigid rules and these may inhibit them in dealing appropriately with unusual 
cases. Deviation from the rules is extrerrely dangerous in a large 
nnmici]?Cility because "it may open up a host of new demands, many of them 
undeserving. "33 
Vfuen it carne time to review the choices open, the Commission rejected the 
continued use of individual metropolitan boards and was opposed to 
amalgamation into one city, even though it expressed the view that the then 
population of the metropolitan area, 420 ,ooo people, would hardly create a 
city that would be "too big." In view of the subsequent creation of Unicity 
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Winnipeg, in the early 1970s it would have been interesting had the Carrmission 
developed the arguments against amalgarna..tion in rather nore detail. .All the 
Report says is that this choice was considered, carefully weighted, and was 
found to be wanting. 
The reccmnendations of the Com,mission clearly indicate that it had a high 
regard for the system that had been established in Metropolitan Toronto. It 
recarrmended partial amalga:rration of the constituent nn.micipalities in the 
metropolitan area to fo:rm eight cities. The Mayors of each of these cities 
would fo:rm the metropolitan council with the addition of six' controllers 
elected from six new- districts with approximately an equal number of voters in 
each. These controllers would fonn a Board of Control. In order to avoid 
parochialism on the :part of the controllers, each district should contain :part 
of at least two of the new- cities. .Although the use of a Board of Control was 
popular in Ontario at the time the Carrmission was reporting, it had not been 
used in Manitoba or in Western Canada. 
The task of the Board of Control was to be the preparation of plans and 
policies for the approval of the Council and the supervision of adopted plans 
and policies. The Cha.i:r:man was given a strong position in that he was to be 
roth the titular and executive head of the Council and the Board of Control. 
In the first instance the Cha.i:r:man was to be appointed by the provincial 
govemrne:nt; subse:ruentl y he was to be elected by the members of the 
metropolitan council from an:ong themselves or from outside their number. 
In recarrmending the series of amalga:rratio:ns which would result in eight 
cities, the Carrmission explained that it had not attempted to create cities 
with equal population but had attempted to meet minimum size criteria for a 
viable urban cormrunity. However,the Carrmission did not specify how size was 
to be measured; population rather than areal extent or tax base can be 
assmned. 
In the field of education, the Carrmission recommended the creation of a 
Metropolitan School Board to have control over all capital expenditures for 
education, to receive and distribute provincial grants for education and to 
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select and purchase school sites. The Report stated that it was a fundamental 
principle of the Carrmission' s proposal that the resources of the metropolitan 
area could justifiably be used to provide essential school accarrm:xia.tion up to 
a reasonable mininrum standard for the entire area. "If local boards desire to 
provide extra accanm.:x:la.tion in addition, then extra expenditures would have to 
be provided by local levies on the ratepayers in the nnmicipality or school 
area concerned. II 34 
The Carrmission made passing reference to the existence of a Royal 
Carrmission of Education and it was the recCliTI[Ieildations of this other 
carrmission that were considered subsequently and resulted in changes in the 
organization of education in Manitoba. 
Towards the end of its discussion of education, the Carrmission noted that 
the Canadian education system 11 carne to us from Britain via the New England 
States into Western Canada. 11 It considered that the British system had now 
changed and independent elected school boards have been el.irn:inated. Education 
is now one of the responsibilities of the County Council. "We in Canada, 
however, have slavishly foil~ the practice which is still in use not only 
in New England States but in all jurisdictions in the United States. "35 There 
is no follow-up to this critical CCliTl[Ieilt which appears to indicate that the 
Carrmission may have seen merits in eliminating independently elected school 
boards but did not rega:r:d this change as politically feasible at the time. 
The Carrmission' s recOJIIJlEil.dations relative to other services contained no 
surprises. The division of responsibility for sewer ·and water service and 
public transportation was to remain substantially unchanged with, however, the 
elimination of separate boards, their responsibility being centralized in the 
new :Metropolitan Council. .As to the distribution of electrical p:wer, the 
Carrmission was prepared to go no further than to suggest that this vexed and 
highly political question should be discussed further. 
The local responsibilities for the airport were to be assumed by the 
Metropolitan Council and the responsibility for water, transportation, power, 
and airport facilities should be placed under the authority of a Public 
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Utilities Carrmission carrposed of the Chainnan and six members of the 
Metropolitan Connell. The introduction of a Public Utilities Commission which 
was rmknown in Manitoba but quite ca.rrmJn in Ontario is a further indication 
of the Corrmission's preference for the Ontario m:xiel and was justified, in the 
opinion of the Corrmission, on the gronnds that "there should be a :minimum of 
political interference in the operation of the self-sustaining facilities. "36 
It is interesting to note that the Corrmission regarded the provision of public 
transit as a "self-sustaining" utility. They did not anticipate the need to 
subsidize the provision of the transit service, a need that became rapidly 
apparent in the early days of the metropolitan gover:nrnent. 
The responsibilities of other special purpose bcx:lies such as the Rivers and 
Streams .Authority, the Harbour Corrmission and the Civil Defence Organization, 
were to became the responsibility of the Metropolitan Connell, as was 
jurisdiction over the responsibility for hospitalization of indigent patients, 
the maintenance of neglected children under the Child Welfare Act, homes for 
the aged, and ~ of the costs related to the administration of justice. 
The maintenance of dykes and other provisions for flood control and the 
control of mosquito abatement were to became metropolitan responsibilities, as 
were various fonns of licensing. 
Under the heading of miscellaneous responsibilities, there is also passing 
reference to the use of develop:nent and redevelop:nent provisions contained in 
the National Housing Act (NBA). The metropolitan conncil, in 0""'"10 with the 
local conncils, should have all the powers of a nnmicipality nnder this 
legislation. The extent to which the metropolitan gover:nrnent might use the 
powers of the NHA. was to became a continuing issue later. 
In addition to responsibility for certain social services already 
mentioned, the Corrmission was of the opinion that welfare should become a 
metropolitan responsibility but that its administration should be left to the 
local connell - a seeming paradox. The explanation for this recarrmendation 
contained statements which appeared to be critical of the way in which welfare 
payments were administered at that time 1 and seemed to indicate that these 
fnnds should be provided by the entire metropolitan area but that their 
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distribution should be very much a local :rratter. The Commission carrmented 
that "sometimes bigness itself is the cause of inefficiency." 
Further indication of the Corrmission's attitude to planning is given in the 
recarrmendations under the heading . of "regional planning and zoning. " The 
Corrmission did not appear to be aware of the problems developing in 
Metropolitan Toronto resulting from a lack of a clear definition of where 
local planning resp:Jnsibility ended and where netropolitan resp:Jnsibility 
began. The Corrmission recamrnended that the netropolitan corrmission be given 
"adequate powers to direct and control in a general_ way the physical 
developnen.t of the entire netropolitan area, "37 (e£r!Phasis added) and went on 
to recarrmend that any local developnen.t plans and land use regulations should 
confonn to a comprehensive plan of metropolitan developnen.t. The Commission 
also recarrmended that the Metropolitan Council's jurisdiction should extend 
beyond its political boundaries and cover "an outer fringe where the future 
land use should be predominately agricultural. "38 A Metropolitan Planning 
Board was to be established and in planning :rratters there would be right of 
appeal to the Manitoba Municipal Board, all of which followed the Toronto 
model very close! y. 
In the presentations to the Corrmission, it had been pointed out that the 
City of Winnipeg provided large parks and golf.· courses which were enjoyed by 
all. The Corrmission recarrmended that certain large :parks,· recreation areas 
and cultural centres should be the Iesp:JnSibility of the Metropolitan Council 
but cammunity clubs and local cultural activities should continue to be the 
responsibility of the local councils. 
To overcome variations in assessment and to eliminate inBIUities in the 
distribution of industrial tax revenue, the Metropolitan Council was to be 
given a very strong role in the question of assessment, taxation and finance. 
It was to be given exclusive Iesp:Jnsibility for the assessment of taxable 
properties. Furthenrore, there was to be a unifonn mill rate for all of the 
industrial property in the netropolitan area "and the amount so levied and 
collected to be distributed among the rrn.micipalities prop:>rtionately." Income 
from the business tax should go to the Metropolitan Council as part of its 
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:r:evenue and it should also have exclusive power over the issue of debentures 
for its own purposes and for the purposes of local nnmicip:Uities and their 
boards. The Metropolitan Council would take over all the old debenture debt 
and also assume responsibility for all sinking funds and reserves. Again, the 
preference for the 'lbronto m:xlel is apparent. 
The Commission's final recanmendation was that provision be made for the 
review of the operations of the Metro Council after its first five years of 
operation, by a committee or commission set up by the provincial gover:rniEilt. 
In view of contemporary interest in participatory democracy and the role of 
the elected politician - the question of whether he is a delegate or a 
representative of his electorate - it is interesting to refer to the 
Commission's view on this matter. In the view of the Commission, dispensing 
with the referendum on major financial issues would "compel the elected 
officials to stand up and be counted. " Acco:rding to the Commission this would 
have a two-fold effect, "the first is that a candidate who has proven roth 
ability and good judgement on issues will be returned by a comfortable 
majority while the one with poor judgement is eliminated, the second is that 
the former invariably deserves and receives the confidence and respect of the 
electorate. "39 In light of contemporary discussions of local politics, this 
view may sound a little naive and simplistic, as is their reference to the 
familiar statement by Ednond Burke. 
The point has already been made that any assessment of the Report and 
Recorrmendations of the Commission can only ·be made . £airly if it is seen 
against the background of attitudes, values and events that were current at 
the time the Report was being written. It is easy to be critical with the 
benefit of hindsight and although subsequent events supported the wisdom of 
same of the Commission's recorrmendations and questioned others, the Report is 
a remarkable document. Remarkable because of the breadth and detail of its 
considerations, because it served to clari£y and crystalize a wide range of 
points of view on a very complex subject and finally because it is IEmrrkably 
free from parochialism and preservations of status-quo. It is true that the 
Commissioners oorrowed heavily £rom the 'lbronto m:xlel but it must be 
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rerrernbered. that at the tine Metropolitan 'lbronto was the most dramatic and 
promising irmovation in local gove:r::rmen.t on the North American continent, 
perhaps in the world, and high hopes -were held for its success. 
'Ihe Rep:::>rt of the Commission was well received and drev.r favourable carrment 
fiam both of the daily papers. Sane concern. was exp:r:essed about the 
arnalgarna.tion of same 14 nnmicipalities into eight cities, but this came mainly 
f:rom local politicians who feared that they might lose out in the carrpetition 
for seats on the nev.r city council. 'Ihe lack of citizen interest in the Rep:::>rt 
is not surprising when viewed in the context of the late 1950s. 
Those who were professionally or politically interested in the future of 
the metropolitan area 1 while supporting the general tenor of the 
recanmendations -were, of course, a.wm:e that they would have an opportunity to 
influence the actual legislation that would result fiam the Commission's 
recanmendations. Generally, the Commission's strong advocacy of a fonn of 
metropolitan government came as no surprise and the reaction to the Report was 
"let's get on with it." 
Although this review of the ReJX)rt and Recorrmendations of the Commission 
has underlined a number of what are considered to be its deficiencies, the 
historical significance of the Rep:::>rt to conterrpJrary students of local 
government refonn cannot be overemphasized. It presents a clear and detailed 
picture of the opinion of experienced nnmicipal men at that time. 
Once again, applying the criteria set out in the "Introduction," the 
recanmendations of the Commission would have increased efficiency by the 
centralization of the provision of services. The use of electoral wards, 
though not specified by the Commission, would have countere:I the loss of 
::r:espansiveoess caused by arnalgarna.tion into, eight cities and would have helped 
to provide adequate representation. As the issue of openness was not 
addressed it can be assun:e1. that there would be no change in this. '!he 
qualities of leadership, flexibilit:Y and ccmni1::nalt can only be judged on the 
basis of perfo:r:nance, but it can be said that there was nothing in the 
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recarrmendations of the Carrmission that would inhibit the exercise of these 
qualities. 
The carrposition of the Council, the ma.:yors of the eight cities and six 
directly elected controllers 1 would have posed a piOblem. It can be assmned 
that the ma.jors would have given priority to city conce:r:ns while the 
controllers would have been influenced by their metropolitan mandate 1 thus 
providing a potential conflict situation. The lack of recognition of this 
piOblem ma.y be explained by the almost exclusive preoccupation with the 
"service" IOle current at that time. This and the persistence of the 
"businesslike" tradition in Winnipeg piObably provided the basis for the 
assumption that a group of experienced people, however selected, would be able 
to arrive at a consensus on questions of the provision of services. 
6. 'lEE INITIATICiil OF MEmOPOGITAN GCJVERNMENl' - 1960 
In 1958 the Progressive Conservatives under Duff Roblin 40 had defeated 
Douglas Campbell's Liberal reg.ime that had been in office for many years. 
This change in provincial administration resulted in a change of a mnnber of 
provincial policies including those related to Metropolitan Winnipeg. The 
predominantly cautious rural character of the administration under Campbell, 
typified by it's "pay as :you go" government, changed, and there was a stiOnger 
urban voice in the new government. Roblin himself was an urban man and had a 
long association with political and business interests in Winnipeg. He ·was, 
however, a skillful politician and realized that a dramatic swing from rural 
to urban preoccupations would not be acceptable, particularly as rural 
influences -were still strong in his party. 
Although the refonn of local government in Winnipeg had not been an issue 
in the election, it was a topic of particular personal interest to Roblin. He 
and his .in:lrre:liate associates in the Cabinet realized that some fo:r:m of 
metropolitan government was necesscn::y. They also considered that cc::xrplete 
amalgamation would be unacceptable to both the local politicians in the 
Winnipeg area and to some of the members of the provincial . Progressive 
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Conservative party who were concerned with the iiiY?lications of one large urban 
government representing, in tenns of both population and economic base, over 
half of the province. They considered that an arnalgama.ted City of Winnipeg 
could be a rival to the provincial government. Also there had to be a 
response to the reccmnen.dations of the Investigating Commission. 4l . 
The drafting of the legislation based p:rrtly on the Investigating 
Commission's report was a task in which Roblin was personally involved. He 
instructed Mr. William Johnson, Q.C., the Deputy Minister of Municipal Affairs 
to undertake this task assisted by Mr. Gerald Rutherfo:rd, a skilled 
legislative draftSIIICID. 
Roblin instructed Johnson to give first priority to the preparation of 
legislation and this task occupied a substantial part of his time in late 1959 
and early 1960. Although the legislation drew on other experience, it was 
essentially a "home grown" prcxluct in that no "out-of-tONll" experts were 
fonna.lly consulted. In developing ideas, Johnson took advantage of his wide 
range of personal friendships arrong political and administrative figures in 
Metropolitan Winnipeg. The author recalls partit:ipa.ting in same of these 
discussions and in assisting Eric Thrift in the preparation of a number of 
working pa.pers dealing with population growth, alternative methods of 
developnent control and the division of metropolitan Winnipeg into ten 
electoral districts, for example. Preliminary drafts of legislation were also 
circulated infonna.ll y for CCliiiileilt. 
In retrospect, the preparation of the legislation represents an interesting 
example of the way in which major new policies were hanmered out and 
translated into legislation in those days. There was no public consultation, 
in fact, the public was probably not aware that legislation was being 
prep::n:ed. The actual task of preparation was assigned to one senior civil 
servant working very closely with Premier Roblin and using vmat is now 
somewhat disparagingly referred to as the "old boy network" ·to obtain the 
advice and assistance of infonned and experienced people. 
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One very important by-product of tbis process was that many of those who 
subsequently held senior political or administrative positions in Metro had 
been consulted and had contributed to the preparation of the legislation. In 
tbis way they had become at least partially committed to the principles and 
policies incorporated in the legislation. Although ccmnitment was not total 
in every case, it was sufficiently general to cause those subsequently 
involved to put out substantial efforts to make the new- system· to which they 
had contributed work - particularly in the early days of Metro. 
"While accepting the idea of a two-tier system, Roblin and Johnson did not 
accept the recClltiiTeildations of the Ccmnission in their entirety. .As subsequent 
detailed discussion will show, there v;ere a number of departures, one of the 
rrost significant being that education was not considered at all. Same changes 
in the administration of education were already in process, based on the 
findings of another Ccmnission, and it can be assumed that it was considered 
unwise to make any further changes at that time. 
Metro was not to have overall control of capital expenditures for the 
entire metropolitan area as was the case in Metropolitan Toronto. Also, the 
legislation provided for direct election of ten metropolitan councillors from 
new- pie-shaped electoral districts which were required by legislation to 
contain at least parts of two nnmicipa.lities. Furtherrrore; in order to 
maintain same sort of centre-city to suburban balance, not rrore than five of 
the electoral districts were to contain a majority of voters from the City of 
Winnipeg. 
The first Chai:r:man was to be appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor in 
Council and subsequent Chai.nnen were to be elected by the Metropolitan 
Council. One of the councillors or a former Chainnan could be elected. 
Again, the Toronto rrodel was followed and, in view of the controversy aver the 
method of selection of the Mayor of Unicity Winnipeg a decade later, it is 
interesting to note that there was little or no discussion of the method of 
selecting the Metro Chainnan. The legislation also contained a significant 
administrative innovation. The concept of a city manager or chief executive 
officer was introduced in the fo:rm of an Executive Director who was to be the 
41 
senior salaried administrative officer and who "WOuld be responsible for both 
the co-ordination of policy ideas and their ilrplementation once they had been 
adopted by the Council. 
~ measure of the acceptance of the need for metropolitan government and 
an indication of skill with which Roblin and Johnson had developed their 
legislation can be seen 'When it is noted that Bill 62, An .Act to Establish the 
Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnirm and to Provide for the Exercise 
by the Corporation of Certain Powers and .Authority, was adopted in six weeks 
by an almost u:na.nirrous vote of the Manitoba Legislature. In the process of 
considering the Bill, the Legislature received very little fonnal or infonnal 
response from the public or from interest groups and, in light of the 
political turbulence which was subsequently generated by the introduction of 
metropolitan gove:r:nment, it is interesting to observe that this sto:r::nw child 
had a very painless birth. 
In introducing the Bill to the Legislature, Piemier Duff Roblin described 
it in the following terms, "the principle on which this Bill rests consists of 
rather two silrple thoughts: first of all, that we should develop a central 
planning authority for this metropolitan area that "WOuld be charged with the 
responsibility of providing a unified developnent plan for this large urban 
area; and secondly, that we should also provide for central control of 
essential services to the public within this same urban area."42 
Johnson recalls Duff Roblin's insistence that the legislation should 
p:rovide for a "business-like" fonn of gove:r:nment and this influenced the 
selection of a structure which incorporated an Executive Director whose role 
would be very much like that of the general manager of a private corporation 
reporting to a board of directors, the elected Council. 43 The original 
legislation made it quite clear that the Council was to have no day to day 
administrative role 1 this being left to the Executive Director and the 
Directors of the various functional divisions of the metropolitan staff. .As 
has been mentioned, the desire for a "business-like" government probably 
influenced the selection of the first Chai.nnan, Richard H.G. Bonnycastle, a 
businessman with a considerable local and national reputation but 'Who had no 
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political experience. Partly to campensate for this lack of political 
experience, Bonnycastle, with the approval of DUff Roblin, appointed Elswood 
Bole as the first Executive Director. Mr. Bole had considerable local 
political experience roth as an elected and as an appointed official, having 
established a reputation as a politically skillful and forceful administrator 
"While Mayor of the suburb:m municipality of St. Vital. In principle and in 
practice the 13onnycastle/13ole combination represented a substantial assembly 
of abilities and experience, and access to a wide network of influential 
people in roth gover::nment and in business. 
It is not an exaggeration to say that the political cormnmity of 
Metropolitan Winnipeg greeted the passing of the legislation with a sigh of 
relief. At last the decade of discussion and debate was over and some 
positive action had been taken. 'Ihe ne;vspapers greeted the passage of the 
legislation as heralding in the rnillennium and Premier Roblin and his 
gave:rniiEil.t turned to other urgent tasks. 
In the early Fall of 1960, in addition to making some provincial senior 
administrative appointments, Bonnycastle rorr<:Med some senior staff from the 
City of Winnipeg to help with the initial foiiiJa.tive work. Subsequently, Mayor 
Steven Juba and certain other members of the Connell of the City of Winnipeg 
complained that Metro was luring away their senior staff with offers of 
"exorbitant" salaries. 'Ihe question of the proposed salaries for the senior 
Metro staff was the first in a long series of issues raised by the City of 
Winnipeg. 
'Ihe initial organizational work was well done, and by the time the first 
Metro Council was elected in November 1960, 13onnycastle and Bole were able to 
recommend a detailed administrative structure with the names of those who 
could fill the senior positions. 
Figure 1 shows the administrative structure that was put in place based on 
the broad outlines indicated 1n the legislation. It should be noted that 
although the legislation did not require it, Connell decided to use the 
familiar "councll-carmittee" system rather than taking advantage of the 
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legislation which provided for a simpler administrative structure and a clear 
distinction between policy-making by Connell and policy-administration by the 
senior staff officers, co-o:rdinated by the Executive Director. 
The legislation provided that the term of office for the first Council 
-would be four years in order to give it time to get m:ganized and then develop 
a record of perfo:rrnance for which it could be held accountable at the first 
re-election. Following the first term, subsequent Councils -would hold office 
for the custam:u:y two years. 
In addition to Finance, Personnel and Planning Divisions, whose functions 
are obvious, the Water and Waste Division took over the combined 
responsibilities and staff of the fo.:rmer Greater Winnipeg Water and Sanitary 
Districts. The Streets and Transit Division assumed the functions of the 
Greater Winnipeg Transit Carrmission and the added responsibility for 
:rretropoli tan streets. Parks and Protection was a combination of several 
unrelated functions; parks, civil defence, and flood control. 'Ihi.s dissilnilar 
collection of responsibilities which fanned a division of comparable size with 
the others was also influenced by the fact that the first Director, .Andrew 
Currie, had prior experience in both recreation and civil defence. 
"Protection" did not include police and fire, as these weie to remain the 
responsibility of the area municipalities. 
The legislation provided that the Metro Council could assume its 
responsibilities in stages. When it was ready to assume a responsibility it 
-would ask the provincial govermnent to publish the necessary Order-in-Council. 
During 1961 the assumption of responsibilities proceeded in an orderly manner. 
Although some advocated the completion of the Developnent Plan before assuming 
responsibility for land-use control, it was decided to take over the entire 
responsibility for planning on 1 April 1961. As this responsibility carried 
with it a substantial administrative task in connection with the issue of 
zoning, building, plumbing and electrical permits and related inspections, 
this necessitated the transfer of professional, technical and clerical staff 
from the municipalities. The majority of the inspections group, including all 
of the senior staff, came from the City of Winnipeg. Administratively, the 
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transfer caused only minor problems; politically there was some talk of "loss 
of local autonc::xey-" and disagreements over specific developrent approval 
decisions persisted. It is significant to note, however, that no one 
advocated to the subsequent Review Commission that this responsibility should 
be returned to the area nnmicipalities. 
A discussion of the successes and failures of the govern:me:nt 'Which was led 
by the Bonnyca.stle/Bole duo will be given subsequently, however, at this 
point, it is relevant to mention the position taken by the City of Winnipeg,_ 
and nore :particularly, its Mayor, Steven Juba.., throughout the lNhole period 
that preceded the Metro Winnipeg Act and during the life of Metro. 
Winnipeg's consistent opposition to any new fonn of govern:me:nt 'Which did 
not afford the City of Winnipeg and its Mayor a central and powerful position 
was consistently rraintained throughout the late 1950s and, in retrospect, it 
nay seem surprising that two experienced people such as Roblin and Johnson 
should not have been able to anticipate the violent conflict that quickly 
developed as soon as the metropolitan govern:me:nt was fo:r:mecl. However, Johnson 
was later of the opinion that the metropolitan govern:me:nt moved too rapidly in 
taking over its responsibilities. He believed that IIll.lch of the conflict could 
have been eliminated if the metropolitan govern:me:nt had asSl.III)ed only those 
responsibilities that were relatively uncontroversial and had waited until 
substantial public and political demands had developed before· taking over 
additional services. Johnson's point of view presupposes that this demand 
would have developed and, in the view of the author at least, this is 
questionable. 
One example will serve to illustrate the kind of political issue that was 
used to generate Metro nnmicipal conflict. It also demonstrates the skill of 
Metro's chief opponent, Mayor Juba, in selecting issues. On 7 May 1961, Mayor 
Juba announced a public meeting at City Hall for the purpose of giving 
citizens an opportunity to air their complaints about the metropolitan 
govern:me:nt. 
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For same time it bad been known that parts of the structure of the old City 
Hall were deteriorating, particularly the gallery that encircled the Council 
Chamber. .As Metro bad recently assmned responsibility for the administration 
of building by-laws which included the question of safety of public buildings, 
Mayor Juba' s administrative assistant asked for confi:rmation that the Council 
Chamber and its gallery would be safe to use for the meeting. After 
discussions by technical experts, including the Engineer for the City of 
Winni:peg, who had previously been responsible for safety of public buildings 
and was familiar with the conditions of the City Hall, it was agreed that no 
nore than 75 persons should be admitted to the gallery~ It was also suggested 
that Mayor Juba' s meeting might be transferred to a city-owned theatre which 
was across the street from City Hall. Juba. refused to transfer his meeting, 
saying that this would cause confusion, and Metro was held responsible for 
same 300 people being turned. away from this meeting because there was no room 
to accarnm:Jdate them. 
Political opposition to metropolitan governm:mt was not exclusive to the 
City of Winni:peg but extended. throughout the majority of metropolitan 
:municipalities. In view of this, Mayor Juba attempted to create an 
association of majors and reeves to act as the fonral means through which 
criticism of metropolitan government could be co-or:di.nated and channeled.. He 
was not completely successful in this endeavour as a number of suburban 
mayors, notably Joseph Guay of St. Boniface, 44 though frequently critical of 
Metro, were not prepared to take part in a sustained and organized attack 
directed by Mayor Juba. Mayor Guay, for example, was realistic in his 
attitude and realized that his city could gain through co-operation with 
Metro. '!hough basically co-operative, Guay could ·be dramatically critical of 
Metro at times when he considered this necessa:ry, either because of the nature 
of the issue or when he felt that, in his own words, "I have to keep you guys 
on your toes! " 
In retrospect, the persistence of the political conflict was predictable, 
as it was based on the transfer of power. Those who lose power are sure that 
the recipients are exercising it with a lack of expertise and understanding, 
both metropolitan systems show evidence of this. 
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A comparison of the tv.Jo Canadian metro systems can be based on identifying 
the forum within which the conflict takes place. As the Conncil of Metro 
Toronto is a fonn of federation, metro-nnmicipal conflict occurs in the 
Conncil and its carnmittees, a forum that allows internal political alliances 
and attitudes to carne into play, often with little public discussion in the 
press and other media except when a nnmicipal politician deliberately decides 
to "go public" and talk to the media about the issue. In contrast, the 
Winnipeg Metro Council did not provide this kind of ints::nal forum and all of 
the roetro-rmmicipal conflicts took place externally with a.lnlost daily 
reporting by the media of the current stage of the conflict. Advocates of 
open govennnent rna.y see merit in the Winnipeg system, while advocates of 
consensus politics would derronstrate that only in the Toronto situation is 
this possible. 
Experience qualifies this simple distinction. The reco:r:d of Metro winnipeg 
shows a number of examples where consensus was achieved through infonnal 
political and staff liaison, particularly when there was a mutUal desire to 
get a job done rather than to create political capital out of the situation. 
Obviously a willingness to reach consensus is essential. Where this does not 
exist, issues became polarized and conflict results. 
Conflict was further heightened by the style of operation of the Metro 
govennnent and its senior officers. Two factors detennined this style. The 
first was the structure of Metro which introduced to Winnipeg the rna.nager or 
executive director. The first executive director, Elswood Bole, saw his role 
quite clearly as the co-ordinator and, at times, the mediator in inter-
departmental differences. His strong personality, reinforced by his close 
working relationship with the Chairman, Richard Bormycastle, allowed him to 
establish his position as "first a:rrong equal" insofar as the senior staff 'Were 
concerned. He instituted regular Eriday .norning meetings · of heads of 
Divisions - a tenn deliberately chosen to underline the difference between 
Metro and a conventional nnmicipal govermnent which had Departments. At these 
meetings overall policies and strategies "Were agreed upon and each Director 
kept his colleagues apprised of the activities of his Division, particularly 
those which would need inter-divisional co-operation. The parallels with a 
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private corporation are obvious - further evidence of the persistence of the 
"businesslike" tradition, "Which required that a strong, efficient and 
hanronious image would be projected. 
The second factor "Which dete:r:mined style was that the political attacks on 
Metro started in the early -weeks of its life. In the face of these attacks, 
the senior staff and the Council became "brothers in adversi~" and needed to 
present a united front to survive. Insofar as Council was concern.ed, its 
four-year initial tenn allowed it to both fight its political battles and to 
achieve a high level of perfo:r:mance, J;_E.rticularly in the hard servicing 
function. A shorter tenn would have added the· need to keep one eye on the 
next election and is likely to have created an untenable position for the 
Council. 
A detailed evaluation of Metro's perfonnance will be given later. However, 
at this point it is appropriate to cc:mrent that hard servicing needs were met; 
roads and bridges were built, sewer and water systems were expanded to meet 
the demands of grcwth, the efficiency of the public transit .. was inproved, 
assessment practices were :rrade unifonn and a metropolitan developnent plan was 
prepared and approved by the responsible pl:ovincial minister. Metro's social 
servicing responsibilities were limited to the provision of metropolitan parks 
-and these were substantially inproved with new buildings and additional 
services including the encourageue:n.t of the winter use of these najor parks. 
An awareness of social issues was developed through liaison with the Carmnmity 
Welfare Planning Council of Greater Winnipeg. The Planning Director was a 
member of the Council and staff assistance to the Council for a mnnber of 
research projects including a Social Service Audit was provided. This liaison 
provided the planning staff with some understanding of the social needs of the 
metropolitan area and contributed to the effectiveness of physical planning 
and develop:nent control - Metro's primary function. 
Another useful connection was :rrade with a number of school boards in the 
metropolitan area; there was no Metro School Boa:r:d as in Toronto. Metro's 
research staff provided assistance to the school boards in forecasting school 
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needs. This liaison assisted in the physical planning of school sites in 
developing suburban areas. 
A factor that bad much to do with the subsequent sto:rnw life of Metro was 
the ease with which the legislation was passed and generally accepted as a 
solution to the problems of the metropolitan area. 'When the solution did not 
prove to be a panacea, many became disenchanted or blamed the Metro 
administration for misapplying the concept. Allrost the ·entire discussion over 
the past decade had been conducted by identifying problems and proposing 
solutions - a m::x:ie that encouraged and reinforced the view _that it was 
possible to devise a solution far all t:i:ae. The introduction of any new 
system brings with it a new series of problems; 'When the nnmicipal politicians 
raised ne;v or hypothetical issues, the general _public becarre convinced that 
something had gone seriously wrong with the irrplernentation of what had been 
presented as a method of eliminating problems. Another significant factor was 
the attitude of the provincial gove.:rnnent to Metro. Once the .Act had been 
passed, the Province refused to be involved in the politics that ensued. 
Although it is not unusual for any provincial govermnent to :rraintain a 
separation from inter-rrnmicipal political issues, the tacit support by the 
Ontario govermnent for Metro 'lbronto in its early days was a factor in 
resolving metro-rrnmicipal issues. Similar support from the Government of 
Manitoba could have slowed down, if not largely eliminated, the acceleration 
of the metro-rrnmicipal conflict in Winnipeg. There is no question in the 
author's mind that provincial support was anticipated during the early days of 
Metro; 'When it did not rraterialize the irrplernentation strategy had to be 
revised. 
It is hard to accept that the critical corrments which were rrade during the 
late 1960s referred to the same gove.:rnnent system that was praised so highly 
at the beginning of the decade. 
Rather than being presented as a solution to problems, it -would have been 
wiser to present the new metropolitan gove.:rnnent as a sribstantial step far:wa:rd 
in the evolution of local goveroment, an attitude that -would have clearly 
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suggested that subsequent steps were to follow. As it was, too many :people 
accepted metropolitan government as the answer for all time. 
When the Metropolitan Winnipeg .Act is seen in an historical context, it is 
a highlight in a continuing evolutiona.Iy process. Every year throughout the 
life of Metro, changes were :made both in the legislation and in administrative 
methods. Same legislative changes were in response to political pressures but 
others were remedies to administrative and procedural problems that could not 
have been foreseen by those who prepared the original legislation. 
A number of the amendments illustrate 1 for exanple 1 an evolutionary 
rrovernent away from the "city :manager" fonn of administration to something 
closer to the traditional council-committee fonn. This ·change, which 
demonstrates the persistence of familiar systems and the resistance to same 
fonns of .innovation - in spite of commitment to metropolitan government in 
principal - can be seen as a series of steps starting shortly after the 
inauguration of the first Council with the adoption of a hybrid system which 
added familiar functional committees to the :manager system and culminated in 
1969 with the rerroval of the manda:ta:r:y provision for appointing an Executive 
Director and other Directors with legislative responsibility for the day to 
day operation and :management for the affairs of Metro. 
The first Metro Connell, contrary to accusations of inexperience leveled 
subsequently by the metropolitan rrnmicipalities 1 contained a predominance of 
men with experience on rrnmicipal conncils or school boards including same men 
who gained their experience in the City of Winnipeg. Of the ·ten conncillors, 
only Moffat and Willis had not been elected to municipal office previously. 
The Metro Connell also contained a group of three men, Blurribeg·, Coulter, and 
Chern.iack, who were members of the NDP. The remainder of the Council had no 
overt party designation but the majority of them had indirect connection with 
either the Liberal or Progressive Conservative parties in the province. The 
political affiliation of the three NDP nanbers was openly acknowledged and the 
political affiliations of others were not concealed. However, the first Metro 
Connell did not divide on party lines. Its dominant characteristic, 
particularly in the early days, was a strong sense of unity in face of the 
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attacks from the councils of the metropolitan nnmicipalities. This sense of 
rmity was also very apparent in the senior administrative eche;Lons of Metro. 
A close working relationship developed between . the Directors of the various 
functional divisions and the chairmen and merribers of· the particular ccmnittees 
of Council to whom the individual directors reported. There were, of course, 
differences and arguments within the metropolitan structure - all was not 
sweetness and light. However, unity and strength of purpose was 
characteristic of both the elected and appointed officials of the first 
metropolitan government. 
When reviewing the Metro years it should be kept in mind that there was a 
clear difference between the lines of the "insiders" and the "outsiders." To 
the outsider, Metro presented an image of a closely-lmit group of senior 
adrninistrati ve officers co-ordinated by the Chaiiman and the Executive 
Director and working with Council with very little apparent friction; a very 
different kind of local government - at best highly efficient and at worst, 
arrogant. In a positive sense, this rmity was principally due to 
Bonnycastle's leadership, ably supported by Bole; and in a negative sense it 
was due to the need for solidarity to withstand continued external attacks. 
To the insiders, Metro ·had been given a job to do - the servicing of 
metropolitan needs. It attacked this job with enthusiasm and skill, assuming 
that its reputation would be built on perfol::ffi3Ilce and that it would be given 
an opportrmity to de:ronstrate its value. .Again, an attitude based entirely on 
concentration on the "service" role. When it became apparent that Metro's 
reputation would be judged primarily on the way in which it discharged its 
"political" role, Metro was sadly lacking in roth strategy and tactics. 
The intensity and persistence of the Metro-Municipal conflict was due in 
part to the personalities of the individuals involved, and to the desire to 
maximize the political opportrmities offered by same issues; it was also 
inherent in the structure that was provided. Unlike· Metropolitan Toronto, the 
Metropolitan Council in Winnipeg was . not CClll!J?OSed of representatives from the 
:rranber rrnmicipalities but consisted of ten representatives d.i.J:Ectly elected 
from ten electoral divisions which covered. the whole of the Metropolitan area. 
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Very early on it became apparent that the members of the Metro Council 
would take a "metropolitan" approach to their task and did not consider 
themselves the representatives of any particular group of rmmicipalities. 
Though this point of view was highly desirable - perhaps essential - in a 
Metro councillor, it brought him into direct conflict at times with the local 
councillors who gave understandable priority to the local aspects of issues. 
In Metro Toronto where these two attitudes :were. combined in one person· who was 
both a Metro and a local councillor, these issues could be resolve;rl within the 
Metro council and its comnittees through both foi:mal and info:r::ma.l discussion. 
In the Winnipeg case the structure precluded this method of resolution of 
issues and the alternative was conf:rontation between the two Councils 
concerned. This was not to suggest that all issues :were resolved by 
conf:rontation but rather that confrontation could be easily generated if 
public dramatization of an issue was seen to be a political advantage. 
The wisdom of the early take-over of all of the planning responsibilities 
has been questioned by same knowledgeable observers, including W.J. Johnson. 
Part of the reason for the early take-over was that it was anticipated that 
there would be initial "teething troubles" and that it would be best to get 
these problems over with sooner rather than later. It was also considered 
that, as the issuing of pennits was the final step in the developnent control 
process, a strong planning presence required control of this critical step. 
Furthe:rmore it was thought that the preparation of the Developnent Plan -
which was to be given high priority- could best be done if those involved in 
the day-to-day administration of developnent control could bring their 
influence to l:Jear in a very direct way. From the beginning the plan-makers 
and the plan-.implementors were encouraged to interact both formally and 
info:r::ma.ll y. 
It has also been suggested that it would have been wiser to devote all 
planning resources to the preparation of the Developnent Plan and that the 
assurrption of the full range of planning responsibilities should have waited 
until the Plan had been adopted so that it could serve as the basis for the 
administrative decisions. The pros and cons of this decision can be argued 
but, in support of my recommendation to the Metro· Council, I was, at the time, 
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finnly of the opllllon that unless full pJanning responsibilit_y "WaS quickly 
assumed, the g:rowing political opposition to Metro would soon make this 
assumption difficult, if not :inpossible. Subsequent experience reinforce:i 
this view. 
legislative deficiencies have been mentioned. These deficiencies were, for 
the rcost part, due to assumptions and under-est.iroa.tions that proved to be 
invalid. For example, the absence of opposition to the legislation supported 
the assumption that the member municipalities would take a positive attitude 
to Metro and v;ould co-operate in making it v;ork. No effective provision was 
made for resolving metro-municipal differences. The strength ahd persistence 
of municipal opposition was not anticipated, nor was the speed with which it 
developed. 
Nor did the draftsmen of the legislation foresee the problems arising from 
a situation where, although in law the Metropolitan Council had "sole and 
exclusive jurisdiction" over planning matters, the municipalities were in 
fact, still involved. .As the provision of local services to new areas of 
development was a municipal responsibilit_y, they considered, with 
justification, that they had a legit:i.nate right to have same say in the 
location, character and the timing of new develop:rent. Though not anticipated 
in the legislation, this municipal concern was acknow-ledged in administrative 
procedures. Questions related to new develop:rent were referred to the 
municipality concerned for comment prior to the Metro Council making a 
decision on them. In a substantial number of cases, this arrangement worked 
quite satisfactorily. Hov;ever, from time to time there were instances where 
Metro disagreed with the views of the municipal council concerned and 
political conflict resulted. It is debatable whether or not these conflicts 
would have been substantially avoided if the legislation had established quite 
clearly the municipal right to be consulted and involved in develop:rent 
decisions. 
Ontario's experience with a two-tier regional government where jurisdiction 
for planning is divided between a regional or metropolitan council and the 
municipal councils, indicates that even where municipal involvement in 
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planning is clearly established, problems still arise. Both the Winnipeg 
experience and the experience in Ontario clearly· indicate that all the time 
the responsibility for planning and particularly the control of developnent, 
is divided, there nay be conflict. 
In retrospect, the transfer of responsibilities went reuarkably s:rroothly 
and this observation can be nade not only for planning but for assessment, 
najor parks, the streets and transit. .As for the responsibilities for sewage 
treatJ:nent and water supply, it was "business as usual" but with a new Board of 
Directors." 
In spite of the political at:rrosphere, the successful transfer of 
responsibilities was due in no small measure to the close working 
relationships between the Metro staff and the staff of the cities and 
municipalities in the area. The overwhelming najority of the Metro staff bad 
been working in the metropolitan area either for metropolitan agencies or for 
municipalities and there was an effective infonnal horizontal network of 
contacts and friendships. This situation persisted over the years of the life 
of the metropolitan government. 
'lb same observers it nay seem a paradox that at the same time that bitter 
political battles were being fought out in public, the day-to-day 
administration of the affairs of the metropolitan area were proceeding 
srroothly on a basis of Metro-municipal co-operation. Eiam time to time senior 
staff were called on to provide the amrnmition for the politicians to fire, 
but for the najority of decisions, those which were uncontroversial or which 
bad no potential as political weapons, the ~tier system dealt with these 
satisfactorily even though in many instances, there was no clear line of 
demarkation between the metropolitan and municipality responsibility In some 
cases, over time, working precedents were established to resolve a class of 
problems, in other cases ad hoc decisions were nade to resolve a particular 
question under consideration. 
A number of students of bureaucracies have commented on the significance of 
what nay be called horizontal and infonnal linkages which develop and are 
55 
superilllpose:i UfX)n the fonnally establishe:i and predaninantly vertical flows of 
info:r:ma.tion and decision-making. The decade of metropolitan government in 
Winnipeg is an excellent illustration of these two characteristics of 
administrative structure and also indicates the essential nature of the 
info:r:ma.l, horizontal connections. 
7. :MEffiORlLITAN WINNI:P.Eii REVIEW C!HITSSION - 1962 
The legislation had containe:i provisions for a review of the metro{X)litan 
government after five years. In response to continue:i {X)litical pressure, the 
provincial government decide:i to advance this review and in October of 1962 
appointe:i I.orne R. Currming, Q .c. , the Deputy Minister of Municipal Affairs for 
Ontario and the author of the original MetrofX)litan 'lbronto Legislation, to 
head a Review Conmission. G. Sidney Halter, a Winnipeg lawyer (probably 
better known then as the Conmissioner for Football in Canada) and R.B. (Bob) 
Russell, a prominent lalx:lur leader, were the other members. Russell was 
unable to serve due to ill health and Russell Robbins 1 another local lalx:lur 
leader, was appointe:i in his place. 
The Review Conmission received 60 briefs; 24 from nrunicipa.lities, 12 from 
non-political organizations and 24 from individuals. In addition it hea:r:d 
verbal presentations from 17 municipalities, 10 from non-{X)litical 
organizations and 14 from individuals. The majority of the briefs supported 
the nee:i for a metro{X)litan fonn of government to administer inter-municipa.l 
services. General! y 1 the nrunicipal briefs argue:i for indirect election while 
the briefs from organizations and individuals favoured the existing direct 
method of electing Metro councillors. A substantial nurriber of briefs were 
well reasone:i and thoughtful - the dramatic exception being the brief from the 
City of Winnipeg. 
Early in the hearings Chai.:r:m:m Currming made it clear that he expected the 
presentations to be :base:i on fact. He was not prepare:i to listen to 
unsubstantiate:i criticism, nor did he see the hearings as a forum for 
{X)litical rhetoric. This position cause:i a major clash between the Chai.:r:m:m 
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and Mayor Juba. who subsequently accused the ChaiJ:::man of being "the rudest man 
I have ever met" and that "the Carrmission was 'a farce, a cover-up and a 
srrokescreen' ... What do you expect from him? This man is pro-Metro - he's the 
man who installed Metro in 'lbronto. "45 
The strategy of the Metro Council was in contrast to that of the City of 
Winnipeg. Prior to the hearings of the Corrmission it was decided that the 
Metro brief would be restrained in tone, would not be defensive and would be 
based on fact. The Winnipeg Free Press commented "'Ihe brief points no 
fingers; it makes no protestations. It is a straightfm:ward, dispassionate, 
and readily documented account of the work that Metro has done to· date." 
Metro politicians and staff attended all of the hearings and noted the 
carrments contained in the briefs being presented. Rebuttal evidence was 
imnediately prepared and filed with the Corrmission, usually on the day 
following the particular presentation. In retrospect, this derronstration of 
administrative efficiency can be questioned. At the t:i..rre it annoyed many of 
those presenting the particular briefs which were :rebutted and who felt that 
it represented undue pressure on the Corrmission. However, it should be 
remembered that1 at the t:i..rre, the Metro administration felt that it was 
fighting for its life. It saw the Corrmission as an :impartial, non-political 
tribunal that would judge on the basis of derronstrated perfonnance. 
One limitation of the work of the Corrmission should be noted. As another 
Corrmission had been established to review the fiscal arrangements between the 
Province and its municipalities, ChaiJ:::man Cumming ruled that any discussion of 
the Metro-provincial grants was outside the tenus of reference of his 
Corrmission. This was unfortunate as many of the issues raised by the 
municipalities v;ere related to the size of the Metro levy which was directly 
effected by the level of provincial grants. Airy discussion of local 
gaverrunent refonn which does not include consideration of fiscal planning is 
unrealistic. 
'lb the contemporary observer, the briefs sul:mitted to the Commission show 
concern for both the political and service roles of the Metro gaverrunent but 
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are lacking in any real discussion of open and responsive local government. 
At the time of the Commission hear.lngs, Spring 1963, concerns for open 
government and the need for effective two-way carmn.mication between the public 
and local government had not been articulated to the extent that happened 
later in that decade. 
The Report of the Commission, released in the Spring of 1964, substantially 
confi:r::rred the existing arrangements for two-tier government - direct election 
to Metro council was to continue. In an interview given to the Winnipeg 
Tribune shortly after the Report was issued1 Chainnan Currming explained his 
view of the difference between 'Ibronto whe:re he recamrnended indirect election, 
and Winnipeg where he did not1 by pointing out that Ontario had a two-tier 
county system with indirect election to County Council for IrEilY: :years whereas 
Manitoba had no counties. He also carrmented that the larger number of 
:rmmicipal units in the Metro Winnipeg area would create an unwieldy council. 
It is inte:resting to speculate on the extent to which the Currming-Juba 
conflict influenced this recarrmendation. Although Currming had ignored Juba, s 
outbursts, it was clear from other carrments that he made during the period of 
the hearings, that he viewed the Mayor of Winnipeg1 s views of Metro as 
essentially destructive and that any change which would have put Juba in a 
position of power on Metro council 'WOuld be severely damaging to the two-tier 
Metro concept which Currming believed in. 46 
In the original Metro Winnipeg Act, the government had been given authority 
for all planning in the Metro area and in an "additional zone" extending 
beyond the outer boundary of Metro. Unlike 'Ibronto, responsibility for 
planning was not eli vided between Metro and the area rrnmicipalities. . The 
Winnipeg system created conflict as the area rrnmicipalities ol;>jected to the 
loss of the power to plan for their own areas. '!his problem was further 
intensified by the fact that the responsibility for servicing was divided. 
Metro provided the trunk services and treatment facilities for sewage and for 
the bulk supply of water. The area rrnmicipalities remained responsible for 
local sewer and water services. As the developnent of new suburban areas 
depended in large part on the ability to extend these services the area 
rrnmicipalities -were in the position, in theo:r::y at least, of having to extend 
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local services into areas they had not approved for developnent. Metro dealt 
with this servicing p:roblem by establishing an administrative policy that no 
new- developnent WDuld be approved befo:re it had been conside:red by the. council 
of the a:rea rrnmicipality affected and a recarrmendation from that council had 
been :received and conside:red. Although this policy tended to minimize the 
servicing issue it did not deal with the political issue -the loss of power. 
'!he situation was further heightened by the fact that the Act gave Metro final 
authority in planning :rratters. '!his was in keeping with Roblin's wish to 
c:reate a strong planning authority. 
'!he Cunming Corrmission dealt with this problem by :reccmnending that Metro's 
planning decisions should be subject to "appeal" to the Manitoba Municipal 
Board - following the practice adopted in Ontario. Although the term appeal 
was and still is used when describing the Municipal Boards' function, it 
should be noted that this is not a true appeal in the legal sense. In a true 
appeal the appellate group review- the evidence heard in the first instance, 
listen to argument based on that evidence and make a decision - no new-
evidence is heard. In planning appeals, new- evidence is presented to the 
appellate group so the hearing becanes, in fact a trial de novo. 
The significance of this fine distinction is that the appeal body makes its 
decision based on quite different evidence and opinion from that heard by the 
Cmmcil making the initial decision. In practice, appeal to a Municipal Board 
gives an elected connell the opportunity to avoid long-term planning issues 
and make its decision based on short-term political considerations, lmowing 
that a no:re long-term approach is likely to be taken by the Municipal Board, 
which is not subject to political p:ressu:re. In practice, when the Manitoba 
government accepted Currmi.ng' s recomnendation and incorporated planning appeals 
to the Manitoba Municipal Board, the Metro Council was not unhappy to be 
:relieved of final :responsibility of this onerous and politically volatile 
function. In retrospect, it can be said that the quality of Metro's planning 
decisions suffe:red. 
Although a number of the briefs sul::mitted to the Cmm:dng Corn:nission 
advocated a division of planning authority similar to that in Toronto, the:re 
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was little direct evidence to support an avenue of appeal f:rorn metro/nnmicipal 
planning decisions. It was unfortunate that Cumming was so strongly wedded to 
the idea of an app::>inted provincial boa:r:d to sit in judgement on the planning 
decisions of elected local. conncils .- a system that can be criticized as anti-
democratic. At a nore pragmatic level, and viewed at a distance of some 
twenty years, the planning decisions made by Metro Conncil during the early 
"pre-appeal" years were carefully considered after the opp::>rtunity for the 
expression of views by interested citizens and detailed discussion of staff 
reccmnendations. Even allowing for this author's bias, it is fai:t to say that 
these early planning decisions were of much the same quality as those made by 
the Manitoba Municipal Board after the aJ?P8CU process bad been instituted. 
Had the system of appeal not been instituted, we would now have a l:x:xiy of 
experience against which to test the practice which bas become almost 
nniversal across Canada - some fonn of app::>inted boa:r:d to hear appeals f:rorn 
all or some nnmicipal planning decisions. But the strongest argument for 
final decision at the metro or regional level is that it clarifies 
resp:lllSH>ility and accountability for planning decisions. 
The adoption of Cumming's reccmnendations by the provincial gove:r:::nrnent 
later in 1964 did little to abate the political conflict that lasted nntil the 
end of Metro goverrmEilt in 1971. 
Although Mayor Juba appeared to be the leader of the nnmici:pcil opp::>sition 
to Metro, he was nnable to fonn an alliance of area nnmicipalities as his 
leadership was unacceptable to the majority of the nnmicipal politicians. In 
spite of his skill at political infighting and his almost nnerring instinct 
for picking the issues that were suitable for developing into highly 
politicized situations, he was regarded as a political "loner" and showed no 
real interest in developing an organized consensus of opp::>sition. As far as 
he was concerned the only answer to the situation was amalgamation into one 
city with himself as Mayor- an event that did not occur until later with the 
creation of Unicity. 
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8. '.IHE :uniT. rovERNMENT :oooNDARIES CD4MTSSICIN RmRr - 1970 
In 1966 a IDeal Govern:mant Boundaries Carrmission had been established. Its 
first task was to deal with revisions to the boundaries of school districts. 
later in 1969 it turned its attention to boundaries in the Metro Winnipeg 
area. Although the Commission's tenns of reference appeared to be restricted 
to the boundaries of metro nnmicipalities, the Commission appreciated that 
boundaries are but one facet of nnmici:pa.l organization and could not be dealt 
with in isolation. Accordingly, it asked for and obtained a redefinition of 
its mandate insofar as the metropolitan area was conce:r:ned. Its revised tenns 
of reference "left no doubt in the mind of ·each . member of the Commission that 
the intent of the legislature was for the Commission to examine not only 
boundaries, but also the total structure of local government in Metropolitan 
w:. . ... 47 l.Ilill.peg. 
The first, and only document prcxiuced by the Camm:i.ssion dealing with Metro 
Winnipeg was the Provisional Plan already cited. It was intended as a 
discussion document and, in keeping with conterrporary practice, set out a 
nmnber of alte:r::natives and discussed these, particularly as they would affect 
the costs of governing. It also attempted to p:r:epare a fonnula for evaluating 
costs aver time which :reflected a nmnber of factors such as economies of 
scale, cost of uwrading staff salaries and cost of irrproving services to 
ensu:r:e an adequate level of enviroil!IEiltal quality. This brave and innovative 
attempt to introduce a "quantitative" method of evaluation of alte:r::native 
fonns of government met with considerable scom from the traditionalists "Who 
clairre:i they could not understand it. It is truer to comment that they would 
not take the time and effort to try to understand it. More thotightful critics 
questioned the assl.lirg?tions upon which the evaluation was founded~ A further, 
and no:r:e basic criticism, was the preoccupation with costs to the exclusion of 
the many other factors :relevant to any discussion of local government refonn. 
Infonnal conversations with same members of the Commission and its staff 
indicated that they were awa:r:e of this basic criticism but felt that the 
irrportant question of costs should be dealt with first in the Provisional 
Plan. The Provisional Plan also included "Guidelines and Criteria" to be 
applied. in the process of assessing available altematives. 
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These "Guidelines and Criteria" are worth discussion as they serve to show 
that the Commission was mindful of factors other than cost. They also give an 
indication of the way in 'Which the Commission had approached its task. 
The Commission stated that "its goal [was] the developnent of a form of 
gaverrrrrent that has the cap3hi 1 icy of adapting itself to the complex demands 
of an urban technological socieq while retaining the participatory element 
inherent in local gaverrrrrent" 48 (emphasis added). In o:r:der to do this, the 
form of gaverrrrrent "must be structured so as to be able to identify and adjust 
quickly to social, political and technological change." It should also 
provide "a means of effective carrmunication between citizens and their elected 
representatives at all levels of gaverrrrrent;" and the units of local 
gaverrrrrent "must be politically and economically viable. " "Established 
institutions such as schools and carrmunity clubs, around, and on which people 
centre their activities, should be disturbed as little as possible. These 
institutions assist group action, define realistic limits and delineate 
neighbourhood boundaries. "49 The guidelines also pointed out that certain 
services were area-wide and costs should be borne on an. area-wide ba.sis. 
The Commission also acknowledged that "privately financed investment will 
be an irrportant factor in the continuing expansion of the tax base;" and 
emphasized that "continuing grONth will depend on an inflow of · non-
residential capital" 'Which requires promotion and co-ordination on an area-
wide basis. Failure to do this, resulting in "unco-ordinated competition for 
investment arrong rmmicipalities can lead to uneconomic develop.nent." 
The Commission is to be camrre:nded for emphasizing the significance of 
pdvate investment - an obvious fact 'Which is almost consistently ignored by 
most of the reports on Canadian local gaverrrrrent reform. A reading of other 
reports gives a clear impression that the authors believed that the promotion, 
management and financing of economic grONth is entirely a gaverrrrrental 
responsibility - or perhaps they believe that the need for public-private co-
ordinated and co-operative action is so obvious as to need no mention. 
Whatever the reason, rnost of the systems developed by others perpetuate the 
anus-length relationship between the public and private sectors of the 
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econarqy. Co-operation with the land developnent industry is seen as akin to 
prostitution by doctrinaire planners and municipal managers. We have yet to 
see a m:xiel of local goveii11IEilt that acknowledges that goveii11IEilt, the public 
and the private sector are the tb:r::ee basic a *'P •Sits of a s_ysten. 
After considering how the alternatives met the guidelines it bad 
established, the Ccmnission selected the alternative of a nine city, two-tier 
structure with roth direct and indirect election to the regional council. Ten 
councillors would be directly elected from constituencies fon:ned from the new 
cities. Each city would have one councillor per 50, 000 population including 
its :rrayor, and the "additional zone" - the area imnediately outside the 
regional roundary - would have two representatives chosen from among the 
:rrayors and reeves of the nnmicipalities which were included, in whole or in 
part, in the additional zone. Municipal and city 1:x:nm.daries were to be 
adjusted so that no municipal unit would be partly in and partly out of the 
region, a situation which bad been created when the original Metro Winnipeg 
roundaries bad been drawn and bad resulted in an awkward situation where some 
nnmicipalities bad, in the graphic words of one Metro councillor, "their feet 
sticking out from under the Metro blanket!" In keeping with usual practice, 
the Chainran of the Regional Council would be selected by the Council. 
The planning function was to be divided between the regional and nnmicipal 
councils, following the Ontario m:xiel, with the regional planning staff 
available to service the nnmicipalities on a consulting basis. The Ontario 
m:xiel was also followed for the division of other functions. 
The Ccmnission' s recomnendations concluded with a strong condemnation of 
the practice of holding a referendum on any proposed changes as bad been 
advocated by some, including the Mayor of Winnipeg. It concluded its argument 
against referenda by citing the familiar words of F.drrond Burke on the 
difference between a delegate and a representative - "your representative owes 
you not his industry alone, but his judgement; and he betrays, instead of 
serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion." 
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.An unexpected change in provincial goveriiment pieVellted any serious 
discussion of the Carrmission' s recommendations but its attempt to develop a 
contemporary method of dealing with the problem of local government refonn 
makes it -worthy of note. 
9. 'lEE ROYAL aHfiSSICN CN UDL <DlERNMENT AND FllWCE - 1963 
Although not directly related to the topic of metropoli~ government, 
mention should be made of a Carrmission which was established by the Manitoba 
government in 1963 - 'llle Royal Carrmission on Iocal Government ·and Finance, 
under the Chai:rmanship of the Hon. Roland Michener. In the literature of 
local government refonn this can be described as the "forgotten Carrmission. " 
'lllis is unfortunate as its recarmendations on a fonn of regional organization 
for the province, though never irrplemented, are interesting - ]?Cirticularly 
when they are contrasted with -what happened in Ontario. 
In addition to redefining nnmicipal responsibilities, the Michener 
Carrmission proposed the decentralization of provincial services to regions in 
the following terms: 
... it is proposed that the Province be divided into eleven definite 
administrative regions. Each region will CClll1?rise the entire area of a 
number of contiguous rural municipalities as now or hereafter 
constituted and the cities, towns and villages within them and be 
designated to enable the people of the region to receive in co-ordinated 
fonn and from a designated centre, all the sei:vices of the various 
depart:rrents which the provincial government considers responsive to such 
decentralization .... SO 
'llle Michener Carrmission went on to recommend Regional Councils with members 
from the nnmicipalities comprising the regions and defined the role of the 
Regional Councils as providing "a forum for developing voluntary plans for 
inter-nnmicipal -works and projects and machinery for the settlement of 
disagreements with respect to such plans by the [Manitoba] Municipal Board." 
A further innovation would be the appointment of "a Regional .Administrative 
Officer directly responsible to the Premier or Executive Council, rather than 
to the head of a Depart:rrent ... with the duty of co-ordinating the regional 
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adm:ini.stra.ti..on of all related Provincial services, of serving without vote on 
the Regional Council and providing liaison between the Provincial 
administration and the Regional Connell . .,Sl 
The proposal was opposed by MIA's who saw the Regional Administrative 
Officer as providing a route for the rmmici:palities to approach the Premier 
which would by-pass them and reduce their role as advocate for the 
rmmici:palities in their ridings. It was also opposed by some Ministers and 
their senior staffs who did not take kindly to the idea of a "super civil 
servant" co-ordinating their activities in the proposed regions - a diminution 
of their ability to deal directly with rrnmici:palities conce:ming the provision 
of those provincial services for which they -were responsible. It should be 
noted that, although the Roblin Government had noved away from the ultra-
conservative "pay-as--you-go" policies of . the · preceding Liberal govermnent 
under Douglas Campbell, an ultra-conservative attitude persisted, .particularly 
anong the older Deputy Ministers who had grown up under the Liberal regime. 
Once again an interesting and innovative idea foundered on the now familiar 
shoal of prevailing political culture. 
The recorrmendations -were IllOti vated by a desire to .i.rrprove the efficiency 
and effectiveness of the provision of provincial services and to provide a 
mechanism for inter-rmmicipal co-operation. The failure to deal with the 
realities of the political role and to aclmowledge that, in addition to 
providing for inter-rmmicipal co-operation, the Regional Council should also 
deal with issues which affected the region as a whole, is representative of 
the thinking of that t.i:rre; although the need to deal with region-wide issues 
had been acknowledged by the creation of Metro Winnipeg, this was regarded as 
. •tuati• 52 a Ulll.que Sl on. 
The problem of co-ordinating all of the provincial policies .and programs 
affecting regions is not unique to Manitoba. In recent years there have been 
unsuccessful attempts to get the provincial ministries in Ontario to adopt 
uniform administrative regions as the first essential step to regional co-
ordination. T.he problem is not based on bureaucratic inertia but reflects the 
differing criteria that Ministries use for defining their regions - criteria 
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that nay IIBk:e sense insofar as the concerns and interests of a particular 
:ministry are concerned, but "Which are not universal. 
The ad:m:i.nistrati ve and perhaps symbolic advantag~s of a unified provincial 
presence in a region are obvious - it is suggested that both effeCtiveness and 
accessibility would be substantially il:rproved. However, the trade-off would 
be that individual provincial depart::rrents or ministries would have to accept a 
compromise in the definition of regions. 
It is unfortunate that the Michener Commission's proposal for 
decentralization of the administration of provincial services was not acted 
upon. It would have provided useful experience with an alte:rnative system of 
provincial regionalization. 
10. E.V.AIDATION OF :MEIRO WINNIPEE 
In applying the criteria for effective local gove:r:nment to Metro Winnipeg 
it is imperative to recall the two basic purposes of the Metropolitan refonn 
which -were defined when the legislation was intrcx:luced into the provincial 
legislature. They were the centralization of area wide, or metropolitan, 
services and the provision of a strong central planning agency for the area as 
a whole. The centralization of services was successful; sewer and water 
supply was extended to those areas where it was needed both for existing 
developnen.t which was deficient in these services, and to provide for future 
urban expansion. 
The success of the water and sewer service was due, in large part, to the 
prior existence of the Greater Winnipeg Sewer and Water Districts which, in 
co-operation with the nrunicipalities, provided these services, so a division 
of servicing responsibility was familiar and accepted. Metro was able to 
extend services without having the problems of sharing of capital cost for 
facilities already in place, as Metro had assumed responsibility for the 
capital debt for the facilities fonnerly owned ·.by the Districts. There were 
sarre conflicts with nrunicipalities and land developers about sequence and 
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extent of new areas to be services, as Metro used the ability to control 
service extension as a means of regulating where developnent was to take 
place. 
'lhe public transit system was .inproved. and extended partly through the 
application of inp:roved corporate planning for this service and partly by the 
acceptance of the principle that transit was a service, the cost of which 
should be supported by a subsidy paid from Metro's general levy. By placing 
adrrdnistrative responsibility for both metropolitan streets and the transit 
system under one Director, planning for both of these services was co-
oidinated. 'lhe Metro street system was expanded, additional bridges over the 
two rivers were constructed and inter-nnmicipal variations in street widths 
and design standards vvere eliminated . 
.Assessment of real property was standardized . and inequities which had 
resulted in differences in nnmicipal assessment were eliminated. The extent 
of metropolitan :parks and golf courses was doubled during the life of Metro. 
'lhe facilities provided in the Metro :parks were inp:roved and winter use of the 
:parks was encouraged by the provision of opportunities for skating and 
tobogganing. Responsibility for "public protection," principally flood 
control, nosquito abatement and emergency measures planning, was centralized. 
The City of Winnipeg continued to provide specialized police and fire services 
to nnmicipalities under contract. An area-wide system of emergency phone 
service, one of the first in North America, which bad been initiated by the 
police depart:Jrent of the City of Winnipeg continued and was extended. 
'lhe second purpose of the refonn, creation of a strong central planning 
agency was not as successful as it might have been, due to the intense 
political conflict that was generated by certain planhing issues. The 
efficiency of developnent control, including the adrrdnistration of building, 
plumbing and electrical pennits was inp:roved partly by the adoption of a 
unifonn metropolitan Zoning By-law and by close liaison betv.Jeen the staff 
responsible for zoning and building control and the issuing of pennits. 
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A number of planning proposals, particularly those dealing with the central 
area, ran into stiff opposition which prevented or seriously hindered their 
implementation. Urban renewal p:r:oposals are a case in point; the Metro Act 
gave the central agency the responsibility for planning for urban renewal but 
not the power of int>laoontatian. Conflict between Metro and the City of 
Winnipeg concerning 'Where and 'When urban renewal should take place, and the 
nature of the re-use of affected land, or of existing buildings to be 
incorporated in a renewal scheme, caused problems. Atterrpts by Metro to 
obtain changes in legislation to aclmClW"ledge the need for both planning -and 
implementation of renewal projects to be the responsibility of one agency were 
successfully opposed by the City. This opposition was entirely political as 
the need to revitalize the central area was obvious. Accepting the fact that 
the future of the central area was critical to the economic and social well-
being of the entire area, it followed that the capital cost of imp:roving this 
area should also be a charge against the area as 'Whole. This serves to 
illustrate the problems which arise 'When the logic of :m:magement conflicts 
with politics. 
When the criteria described in the "Introduction" are applied, it can be 
said that the efficiency criterion was satisfied for those services which were 
the :responsibility of Metro with the exception of planning and developnent 
control. In this latter case, administrative efficiency was improved but the 
acknowledgemant of Metro's central position in plarming was never fully 
realized for :reasons which have already been discussed. 
Res{xlnsiveness to metropolitan needs was satisfied in a limited sense - the 
ability of Metro to :respond to all of these needs was limited by both extent 
of :responsibilities and by political conflict. The confusion that persisted 
over the division of :responsibilities also limited the satisfaction of this 
criterion. In spite of efforts to publicize 'Where responsibility rested, the 
public continued to have difficulty in deciding 'Who was responsible for 'What. 
Towa:r:ds the end of the life of Metro the public, particularly those 'Who had 
frequent contact with local government in the course of their business - land 
developers and those whose activities were licenced by local government, for 
exarrple - did become familiar with the division of :responsibilities, but the 
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general public continued to feel that there was "too much local government" 
and that the division of certain responsibilities was arbitrary and 
inefficient. 
The need for open gover rment and good carnmunication betvveen the government 
and the citizens did not became an issue until the later years of Metro. .And 
even then it did not becarre a major issue, probably due to the conservatism of 
the local political culture. Certain interest groups advocated greater 
opermess and local governments generally responded, albeit rather reluctantly, 
to this need. The series of events connected with the ·discussion and adoption 
of the Metropolitan Developrent Plan did enhance opermess insofar as this 
particular function was concerned. In addition to displays in downtown stores 
and an exhibition in Metro's offices 'Which provided the pUblic with an 
opportunity to enquire about the Plan, a series of mandatory public hearings 
were well attended and publicized. In addition to providing infornation about 
the Plan, the public also took this opportunity to ask about the other 
functions of Metro and the way in 'Which responsibilities were divided. 
Un£ortunatel y staff and budget restrictions prevented the setting up of a 
pernanent central infornation office and the benefits gained by the program of 
publicizing and explaining the Plan were lost. 
Direct election provided an excellent level of repr:esenta:tian as has 
already been mentioned. The mandate of the Metro councillors and aldennen 
were quite clear. Questions can be raised about the size of the Metro wards 
and whether they were too large to rraximize representation. Subsequent 
reports and proposals dealt with the question of the ratio of elected 
representatives to electors and the optimum size of an electoral ward or . 
constituency is open to debate. However, ·it can be said that representation 
never became a rna.jor issue during the life of Metro. 
The division of responsibilities and the political conflict that typified 
the Metro period makes an assessment of leadei:ship difficult. However, 
Bonnycastle and his successor, Jack Willis, both provided strong leadership, 
although of different styles. Although the Bonneycastle-Bole combination 
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compensated for Bonneycastle' s lack of political experience, his annoyance 
with the "politic-ing" of Jtiba and others sometimes showed. 
Willis had been active in the local and provincial Conservative party and 
was, therefore, rrore politically attuned than Bonnycastle. But both men were 
skillful in working towards acceptable camp:romises on issues. Jtiba' s 
rejection of any camp:romise on issues that -were of concern to him created 
problems. However1 acceptable camp:romises were negotiated with other 
rrnmicipal councils. 
Willingness to work towards acceptable corrp:romise shoos an acceptance of 
the need for flexihiliq. An objective, longer-range view- of the Metro years 
shows that many of the improvements in the quality of life were the result of 
flexibility on the part of both Metro and the area rrnmicipalities. As for 
cxmnitment, this quality was certainly present in the Metro council .and its 
administration, particularly in the early years. .As has been indicated, a 
comparable level of ccmnit:rne:m.t to the Metro idea was not universally present 
arrong the area rrnmicipalities initially, though it began to develop later on. 
It is interesting to speculate what might have happened had the proposals of 
the Boundaries Carrmission - a strengthening of the Metro concept - been 
implemented rather than Unicity. Certainly, the early response to Unicity 
appeared to favour the continuation of a two-tier system, which by then, was 
familiar and rrore widely accepted. 
11. WE PREUJDE 'IO UNICITY 
During the period that the Progressive Conservative government had been in 
power in Manitoba, the Liberal party had wasted away. 'lhe election of 1969 
was, then, a battle between the Progressive Conservative and New Derrocratic 
parties. During this period both parties had became increasingly urban-
oriented and the future of Metro Winnipeg had been debated at length. 
Partial or total arnalgaroa.tion had been discussed by the area rrnmicipalities 
and in the local press. In June 1968, Metro Council by resolution strongly 
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backed total amalgamation. In light of -what happened subsequently it is 
interesting to recall that, in an interview- given to the Winnipeg Free Press 
in June 1969, Edwan::l Schreyer, the leader of the NDP, advocated a ·new regional 
government with "wider ranging and stronger powers than Metro .... [It] would be 
supported by about the same nmnber of nnmicipal councils as at present, but 
with their powers rrore culturally and socially oriented than financially 
oriented ... rnerribers of the [regional] council would be elected in the same 
fashion as they are now. " He added that the new regional council would not 
necessarily be the first step to total amalgamation; "regional government is 
the logical step to take at this tinte. Total amalgamation is the kind. of 
drastic change that cannot be done well. "53 
Much to the surprise of everyone, including the NDP itself 1 the provincial 
election resulted in a victory for the NDP. Saul Cherniack recalls discussing 
the early election results with Sidney Green, both of wham had been Metro 
Councillors, and speculating on what was to happen with Metro . Winnipeg. At 
this early rrorning conversation, the seeds of Uhicity were sown. 54 
12. UNICITY WINNIP.F.G - 1971 
The new NDP government rroved with dis:patch to tackle the problem. of Metro 
Winnipeg. A group of consultants headed by Meyer Brownstone, a political 
scientist with an acknowledged reputation as an expert in local government, 
working closely with a snall Co.mmittee of Cabinet headed by Saul Cherniack, 
produced a White Paper which was released in December 1970. The stated 
purpose of this document was "To stimulate, and to provide a focus for, public 
discussion on the question of urban refom in the Greater Winnipeg area prior 
to legislation to be introduced at the next session of the Manitoba 
Legislature. 55 
The White Paper is remarkable in that it is the fi.rst attempt in Canada, 
and perhaps elsewhere, to respond to the changes in attitudes, needs and 
expectations that had emerged as a result of the turbulent 1960s. It was an 
approach to local government refonn which acknowledged the changing 
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relationship between the citizens and their municipal govermnent, a 
relationship that required open government, responsive to the needs of the 
citizens and which would provide an avenue through which the citizens could 
easily and effectively bring influence to bear on those public decisions "Which 
affected them most directly. At the same time, efficiencies in the p:rovision 
of services were to be attained by the application of contemporary teclmology, 
while a unifo:r:m level of service was to be available throughout the 
metropolitan area. In practice, any unifo:r:mity of service inevitably involves 
a levelling-up rather than a levelling-down. This was also the period 'When 
the general level of affluence had increased the citizens r expectations of 
.i.rrpravement and extension of both the haid and soft services which were to be 
provided by local government. 
In the wo:rds of the White Paper, "It is the view of this Gove:r:rment that 
all major ser:vices should be unified, but that the local goverrnnent itself-
the political processes of local govenment - must at the same time be 
decentralized and, through a proposed system of Carrmunity Corrmittees, be 
brought closer to the people. We are convinced that these must be parallel 
processes; and that one cannot succeed without the other."56 
The unification of local se:rvices under one local goverrnnent - complete 
arralganation - was to be accompanied by a new system of wa:rds which 'WOuld 
result in a directly elected council with 48 members, each representing same 
10-12,000 people; a substantially larger council than had traditionally been 
used. The wa:rds were to be grouped together in "Cormnmities" each including 
at least three wa:rds. The actual legislation "Which follcmed the White Paper 
created 13 cormnmities, three were fanned from the City of Winnipeg and the. 
remaining ten follcmed closely the bormdaries of the fo:aner suburban 
. . l"t" 57 IIIlllllClpa l leS. 
'Ihe elected cormcillors would have a dUal role, as members of the Unicity 
Cormcil and as members of the Cormnmity · Carrmittee for the cormnmity from which 
they were elected. Certain administrative responsibilities would be delegated 
to the Cormnmity Corrmittees and they would also prepare and adopt a budget for 
cormnmity services. Subseg:uently, the cormnmity budgets would be reviewed by 
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the Unicity Council and incorporated into· the· overall budget for the entire 
city. In addition to responsibility for parks and community centres, the 
Cammmity Ccmnittees would have certain responsibilities for local planning 
and zoning issues. As will be described later, the Cammmity Ccmnittees were 
to have close formal relationships with the citizens of the community through 
Resident's Adviso:r:y Groups. 
In the White Paper, the Mayor was to be elected by Council f:rom anong its 
merribership so it was implicit that he would be the leader of the majority 
group in the large Council; the remainder would fonn an "opposition." The 
intrcxiuction of a fonn of party politics in the Council was a departure from 
the Canadian, and Winnipeg tradition. This tradition held that there was no 
place for party politics at the rrnmicipal level, in spite of the existence of 
a covert fonn of party politics for many years. In pre-Metro days there had 
been a Civic Election Ccmnittee (CEC) and subse:;ruently a Metro Election 
Ccmnittee (MEC) which claimed not to be a political party but an organization 
to encourage suitable people to run for local office. However,· on only one 
occasion during the life of the MEC did it endorse a candidate with an NDP 
affiliation. .All of its other candidates were Liberals or Progressive 
Conservatives. A number of non-MEC candidates VJho were not merribers of the NDP 
did run for office as Independents. This situation produced many of the 
characteristics of partisan elections in that candidates could be grouped 
according to affiliation and a "machine" assisted them to get elected. 
However, a lack of stated party platfonn and further, ·a lack of party 
discipline once the members bad been elected resulted in a situation which bad 
all of the disadvantages of a party system, with none of the advantages. Once 
Unicity was created, the MEC transfonned itself into the Independent Civic 
Election Ccmnittee (ICEC). 
The White Paper advocated an entirely nav structure. There was to be an 
Executive Ccmnittee consisting of the Mayor (ex officio) and the three 
Chai:rmen of Standing Ccmnittees for Planning and Developnent, Works and 
Operations and Finance, and three or more Councillors elected by Council. The 
intrcxiuction of an Executive Ccmnittee was an innovation in Winnipeg and, 
bearing in mind the implied "parliarrenta:r:y" nature of the Council, can be 
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equated. to a Cabinet, with the three Chainnen of Standing Ccmnittees being 
approxiroa.tely equivalent to Ministers and the others as Ministers without 
Portfolio. In addition there was to be a Board of Commissioners, a system in 
use in Alberta and British Columbia, where a group of senior salaried. 
officials, under the chainnansbip of a Chief Commissioner could, in the 
context of Winnipeg, be equated. to Deputy Ministers. The Mayor would also be 
a member (ex officio) of the Board of Ccmnissioners, further strengthening his 
administrative position. Although Metro Winnipeg bad introduced. the idea of 
an Executive Director - the equivalent of a Chief Carrmissioner - a carrmittee 
or l:x:>ard of senior salaried. officials had not fo:rmally been incorporated. into 
the Metro structure. 
The role of the Executive Ccmnittee was to be the focus of policy making 
and to provide a link between Council and the administration. The Board of 
Ccmnissioners was to make recommendations "on all matters concerning the 
carrying out of the executive and administrative goverrnnent of the City. " 
These responsibilities also included preparing and p~esenting the 
recommendations on policy to the Executive Ccmnittee. Figure 2 shows the 
structure of the goverrnnent and administration for Unicity and is taken 
directly fmn the White Paper. 
A further innovation in the White Paper was a discussion of the 
relationships between the proposed. Unicity and the provincial gave:rnrnent. As 
Unicity was an unusual fonn of nnmicipality the p:rov:incial goverrnnent proposed. 
to set up a new Department of Urban .Affairs to deal exclusively with it. The 
existing Department of Municipal Affairs would continue to be responsible for 
all of the other nrunicipal units in the province. The new Department of Urban 
Affairs would also have a role to play in relationships with the fed.eral 
goverrnnent on urban (Unicity) affairs. 
The final section of the White Paper set out a timetable for the 
implementation of the Unicity proposal, with the first election· of Council to 
be in the Fall of 1971. Public meetings -were held throughout the metropolitan 
area at which Saul Cherniack, the minister responsible, and other cabinet 
colleagues appeared, presented. and discussed the proposal. 
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Public reaction to the White Paper was mixed. Both Jack Willis, the 
Cha.irrran of Metro, and Mayor Juba. of Winnipeg endorsed the proposals while the 
majority of members of the area nrunicipal councils expressed concern about 
loss of contact with the people through the creation of a bn:eaucratic 
m:mster, an indication that the proposals for decentralizing the political 
process were not understood. Later, as the proposals became more clearly 
understood, at least by those who took the tin'e to study them, concern was 
expressed about the effectiveness of the Carmnmity Carrmittees which -would have 
no direct legislative or budgetary powers. Cherniack responded by saying that 
if the Carmnmity Carrmittees fail to function as envisaged they will be 
scrapped and a conventional total amalgamation will result - "this is still 
:better than what "We have today. We can't guarantee success of the Carmnmity 
Carrmittees .... that aspect of the plan can't :be legislated. "58 
Early in March 1971, the last of the public meetings, all of which had :been 
"Well attended, was held. Concern had :been expressed about the cost of the 
change but the provincial governrnent said that it was impossible to predict. 
There was little opposition in the City of Winnipeg, the most serious 
opposition earning from the suburban nrunicipalities. The possibility of a 
referendum on Unicity was suggested but rejected. Ironically, after a decade 
of conflict, there was considerable pro-Metro reaction and a call for 
increased powers for Metro. It should, :be recalled that the Boundaries 
Carrmission's report had :been released in 1970 and advocated a continuation of 
the two-level system with a differently constituted council. 
On April 28th, the Unicity Bill was introduced in the provincial 
legislature and referred to Carrmittee. As there had :been accusations of 
"gerrym:mdering" in the designation of the proposed boundaries of the wards, 
this question had been referred to an independent Carrmission for study with 
the result that the legislation finally established 50 wards. 
During the Carrmittee stage of the Bill, Major Juba. was able to negotiate a 
change that was to have a major impact. He was able to persuade the Province 
to agree that the Mayor of Unicity should :be elected at large and not by the 
Unicity council from among its members. This change -would provide the Mayor 
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with a power :ba.se quite independent of Council and destroyed the :possibility 
of using party discipline to make the large council function as was originally 
intended. Juba's widespread popularity ensured his election as the first 
Mayor of Unicity and, as subsequent events showed, allowed him to continue his 
personal style of politics which was to pursue those objectives he wished by 
encouraging conflict in Council and in the administration. His central role 
as a member of the Board of Commissioners and the Executive Ccmnittee allowed 
him to control the programs and :policies which carne forward to Council for 
consideration. His failure to provide any :political leadership was primarily 
the cause of lack of progress that typified the early years of. Unicity. His 
:position of power was not successfully challenged by any individual or group 
in Council. 
One further event is of interest. Originally the NDP had decided to run in 
the Unicity election as a party SllpfX)rted by the provincial NDP organization. 
A weekend caucus was held and .Arthur Coulter, a Metro councillor, was elected 
as Ch.ai:r:rnan of the urban caucus. later the provincial party reversed its 
:position and decided that the NDP would not run as a party. Individuals could 
declare their NDP affiliation, and same 39 candidates did, but they were not 
assisted by the party organization, nor were they carrmitted to the program 
that had been endorsed by the urban caucus. 
The ICEC endorsed 48 candidates and was successful in 37 instances. 
Throughout the campaign the ICEC had denied that it was a political party, 
however, immediately following the election it behaved in a typical :political 
manner by deciding in caucus that it would use its .Jnajority ·on Council to 
ensure that its nembers held 28 of the 29 power positions, as deputy rna..yor, 
and members of the Executive and Standing Carrmittees. 
The legislation, in dealing with the res:ponsibilities of the Cormnmity 
Carrmittees, made it rrandatory for them to "develop and implement techniques to 
maintain the closest :possible corrmunication between the City and the residents 
of the ccmrnmity, and shall carry out and ensure that those residents are 
given full opportunity to represent their views on :policies, programs, budgets 
and delivery of services ...• shall develop and implement techniques to provide 
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the residents of the carrmunity with infonna.tion ...... so The Carrmunity 
Carrmittees were to meet regularly once a month, to facilitate resident 
involvement in budgeting, to report progress at quarterly meetings and to meet 
once a year with all of the residents of the carrmunity at which time a 
Resident Adviso:r:y Group (RAG) was to be selected. 
The legislation is the first attempt in North .America and perhaps elsewhere 
to legislate for resident participation in local govermnent, an attempt in 
line with prevailing attitudes of open govermnent and citizen involvement - an 
attitude that was not always shared, hov.ever, by many of the political and 
administrative traditionalists who fanned the first Unicity Council and its 
administration. Nor did all of the residents eagerly accept the opportunity 
offered. In same communities where there were real issues, initial 
participation was substantial; for exail!Ple in the former City of St. Boniface 
where the protection of francophone culture was an issue, 350 residents 
attended the first consultative meeting called by the Carrmunity Carrmittee and 
146 residents volunteered to serve on the RAG and its carrmittees. 
Participation was also high in the inner city carrmunities where the housing 
and social service provisions for high needs groups were real issues. Philip 
Wichern, whose paper has already been cited, was the Chairman of one of the 
inner city RAGs and his comnents are revealing. In contrast,· in the secure 
and stable suburban carrmunities where there were no real issues, participation 
was poor. 
The lack of political leadership and organization in the Council became 
apparent early on and persisted for reasons that have already been mentioned. 
In addition, the unfamiliarity of the new system and lack of commitment to it. 
reinforced the ineffectiveness of Council as a governing l:xxiy with 
responsibilities for policy and programs. In the early years the programs and 
policies that were pursued were car:r:y-overs f:rom the previous system and 
persisted because of momentum already developed - they continued in spite of, 
rather than because of, the new system. 
One exception can be noted. The new Council tended to divide, based on the 
persistance of the central city-suburbs rivalry. Ad hoc coalitions of 
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representatives from fonrer suburban areas ensure:i that their needs were met. 
One senior administrative ·officer vmo was interviewed in the course of this 
study observed that ne;v swi1IIm:i.ng pools, carmnmity centres and paved sidewalks 
sprang up in the suburbs while the maintenance .. of· existing :facilities in the 
central area of the city was allowed to deteriorate. 
In fairness, it should be noted that the Unicity presented politicians, 
administrators and the public with a system that had no resemblance to VJbat 
was familiar and time was necessary to became familiar with this ne;v system 
and perhaps to modify it to make it rrore workable in the political and social 
context of Winnipeg. Nor was Winnipeg society" comfortable with the changes 
that had occurred generally as a result of the turbulent 1960s and had 
influenced the authors of Unicity. Furtb.eJ:JIDre, unlike the Metro refonn, 
Unicicy was not "horne-grown" but the work of a new- provincial administration 
advised by a group vmo were, in the main, "outside" consultants. 60 As the 
provincial administration wished to take a new- look at how metropolitan 
Winnipeg should be governed, the use of outside experts "Who, as a group, were 
substantially free from the influence of local political culture, may be 
justified. However, a ccmnit::riEnt to making Unicity work did not develop in 
the ranks of the senior administrative officers . until several years after the 
refonn had been enacted and after a number of the first senior .officers had 
retired, taking with them their strong preference for the Metro system. 
Juba' s retirement and, after a short interim period, the succession of 
William Norrie as Mayor (an entirely di:Eferent style of leader, and "Who used 
his connection with the ICEC majority on Council to provide political 
leadership) saw the beginning of a serious attempt to make Unicity work rrore 
effectively than it had done in the earlier days. However, ICEC's nan-:party 
status meant that, as Norrie could not be certain that he could count on the 
support of all of the ICEC members on Council, party" discipline was lacking. 
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13. 'lEE a::r«rrrEE OF REVIEW - CITY OF WI:NNIPEG ACr- 1976 
The legislation establishing Unicicy required that a review- was to be 
conducted during the first five years. In September of 1975 a Review 
Committee was appointed by Order-in-Council. The Chairman was Peter Taraska, 
"Who had served both as a Winnipeg Alderman and as a Metro Councillor and was 
then the Judge of the Citizenship Court in Winnipeg. The members were Earl 
levin, fonner Director of Planning for Metro and subsequently a planning 
consultant in private practice, and Professor Alan O'Brien; a man with 
extensive experience in nnmicipal gove:r:rrrnent both as an academic . and as Mayor 
of the City" of Halifax. The Report of this Committee "Which was published in 
October 1976 is note;vorthy both for its contents and for the clarity of the 
style in "Which it was written. 
This latter characteristic was due :rrainly to the skill of the authors of 
the original draft, but also to the editorial assistance of the Secretary to 
the Committee, Ellen Gallagher, and experienced journalist "Who had also acted 
as Cherniack's Executive .Assistant in the preparation of the White Paper on 
Unicity, another document "Which also reflected her ability to present corrplex 
ideas in a clear and understandable way. 
The first chapter of the Report dealt with the traditions of urban 
government in Canada and is a useful review of the state of the art. "While 
supporting the view that nnmicipal gove:r:rrrnent is significant because it is 
closest to the people and is said to be rrost accessible and responsive, the 
Report carrmented that there has been very little refonn legislation concerned 
with strengthening these two essential characteristics. 
One of these neglected qualities is accountability. Municipal 
government nay be closer to the people, it nay be rrore accessible, it 
nay even be rrore responsive than both provincial or federal governments 1 
but it is not as accountable: the irrq?ortant natter of "Who is to be held 
accountable for the decisions 1 policies and actions of the rrnmicipal 
governments is generally obscure.61 
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The Report went on to comment that in provincial and federal government the 
party in power is clearly acconntable but, because JIOst nnmicipal councillors 
are elected as independent individuals 
usually simply on the strength of their :personal appeal and rarely on 
the basis of any civic policy or platfonn, it is uncarnrron for the 
electorate to lmow how a particular candidate may vote on a given civic 
issue .... In the public mind there is rarely much differentiation made 
between those who voted "yea" and those who voted "nay," the council as 
a whole is seen as being responsible for any given decision.62 
Although this provides a "coarse measure of accountability it has a number 
of serious disadvantages. " For example, a councillor who voted against··· a 
particular decision, shares council's responsibility for the decision. 
Furthermore, because the public cannot easily identify those who are 
responsible for the decision, it cannot hold them, and only them, accountable. 
More important, in the view of the Committee 
and most damaging to the quality of local gove:r:nment, is the fact that, 
because those who should be held acconntable rerrain obscu:re, the public 
cannot, without extrao:rdinary effort, either reward or censure the 
voting records of councillors and, therefore, cannot encourage the 
fonnulation of consistent, coherent and desirable civic policies. 63 
Because of this, "the entire function of municipal policy-making is arbitrary, 
confused, misunderstood and only vestigially developed. " 
The Ccmnittee reccmnended that the parliane•t:aJ:y fonn which was implicit in 
the "White Pa:per and was thwarted by the election of the Mayor at large should 
be made explicit. In addition to reinstating the original intention of the 
Mayor as the leader of the majority group in Council, it was recommended that 
those who did not support the Mayor fo:rm an opposition led by a Chief Critic 
who they would elect from within their number. Although the continuation of' a- · 
three-year tenn for Council was recommended, the office of Mayor and Chief 
Critic should be elected annually. 'lb further the parliamentary analogy, 
Council would also elect a Chaiirna.n who would act as a Speaker:. 
The Ccmnittee was also critical of the arnonnt of administrative detail 
spelled out in the Act. The rigidity of legislated procedures had added 
substantially to the COJ:Iq?lexity of carrying out the business of government. 
This is a dilemrra that the authors of new legislation face, particular! y when 
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an entirely new system is being put in place. 'lhe:re is a tendency to spell 
out procedural steps in same detail to ensure that the new system works as the 
authors intended. Experience with new legislation frequently indicates rnore 
effective ways in which the objectives of the legislation can be attained, but 
these m:xiifications can only be achieved by amendment to the legislation - a 
time-consuming and cumbersome way of i.nproving an ad:rn:i.nistrative process. The 
alternative is to incorporate only the principles of the new system in 
legislation and leave procedures to be established either by provincial 
regulation or by a nnmicipal procedure by-law, or perhaps a combination of 
both. Regulations or by-laws can be rnore easily changed, and this may be seen 
by same to be a disadvantage. However, experience with the City of Winnipeg 
Act illustrated, in the view of the Carrmittee, the problems of putting too 
Irnlch administrative detail in the legislation. 
'!he Carrmittee also carrmented on the relationships between Unicity and the 
Province, both in the field of finance and in policy-making. '!he well Jm.own 
difficulty of an inelastic basis for levying nnmicipal taxation, the real 
property assessment, was mentioned and the idea of revenue sharing rather than 
specific ad hoc provincial grants was reccmnended as a principle. The 
Carrmittee also endorsed a number of principles which the City of Winnipeg had 
agreed with the Province earlier in 1972. Certain of these principles are 
worthy of note, namely: 
as a general rule any political J:x:xjy which is engaged in spending rnoney 
should also be responsible for raising the required revenues through 
taxation, jurisdiction aver and financial responsibility for programs 
and services should be clarified, and it is preferable that a taxing 
authority has same flexibility in choosing the nature of taxation that 
it can resort to. "64 
'!his flexibility could be provided by Winnipeg's residents paying a higher 
rate of provincial income tax or sales tax, as an alternative, or in addition 
to the real property tax. 
In the policy field, the Carrmittee was of the opinion that Unicity should 
became more autonarrous and that provincial over:see:ing should ·be :m:i..nimized, 
including the elimination of appeals to the Manitoba Municipal Board on 
planning issues and the Board's supervision of capital borrowing. · '!his latter 
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could be controlled by establishing a formula which would provide a ceiling on 
the City's capital debt. 
Much of the Committee's discussion dealt with the administration of 
planning and zoning. With the best of intentions, the legislation, by 
requiring IIIOst planning issues to be routed through the Community Committees, 
the Committee for the Environment, the Executive Committee and Corincil, had 
created an extremely cumbersome and time-consuming process. It was 
recarrm:mded that all of the procedures for zoning and sub::livision control be 
eliminated from the legislation and be dealt with by a procedure by-law of 
Council. Most of the planning issues should be dealt with by the Community 
Committees with the Executive Committee of Council taking over the role of the 
Manitoba Municipal BoaJ::d as the forum for bearing appeals. The Council would 
continue to be responsible for the Developnent Plan, the overall policy 
statement. District and "Action Area" Plans would be the responsibility of 
the Community Committees. 
The original Unicity legislation had borroNed from the United Kingdom 
planning practice and had instituted a hierarchy of plans. The Developnent 
Plan was the city-wide planning policy statement; Community Plans applied the 
city-wide policy to the Communities and expanded them to deal with planning 
issues particular to a Community. Where a program ot" developnent, 
redevelopnent or improvement was contemplated for a particular part of a 
Community, details of the program would be incorporated in an Action Area 
Plan. One other feature borrcmed from United Kingdom planning practice was 
the use of develCifiiBlt cont:r:ol. Where appropriate, an area of developnent 
control could be designated by by-law. This would have the effect of. rem:::wing 
the area from conventional zoning by-law control and pennitting a developnent 
proposal to be judged on its merits, providing it complied with relevant 
policy plans. The advantage of this method was that it gave a greater degree 
of flexihi l ity in dealing with developnent proposals. A conventional zoning 
by-law would continue to apply in areas "Where no change was contemplated, thus 
providing certainty in stable areas of the city. 
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The Camnittee also dealt with the question of the basis for :representation 
and rrade the recommendation that the size of wards should be based on the 
number of electar:s, not population as is the usual case. 
Although the basic recommendation - the introduction of a specific 
"parliamentaJ:y" :rrodel for city government - was not accepted it is worthy of 
note as it provides an interesting alternative to the other refon:ns discussed 
in this study. Both it, and the original Unicity proposal clearly aclmowledge 
roth the service and political functions of rrrunicipal goverrunent. In 
addition, roth :rrodels acknowledge the need to centralize the service function 
while decentralizing the political role. 
Figure 3 has been prepared to illustrate the system of government 
reccmnended by the Review Ccmnittee. It shows that the legislative and 
executive functions would be separated from the administrative role, the two 
being connected through the link between the Executive Camnittee of Council 
(the "Cabinet" ) and the Boa:rd of Management (the senior staff group) . A 
public infonna.tion service was acknowledged as one of the ilrportant functions 
of the City Clerk's office and provided decentralized public infonna.tion 
offices in each Camrmmity. 
One other departure from nonna.l practice should be noted; the heads of 
administrative divisions would not be responsible to a Camnittee of Council 
but to the Chief .Ad:ministrati ve Officer (CAD) . Their relationship to the 
Ccmnittees of Council would be to provide infonna.tion and advice only. In 
this way the Ccmnittees of Council would be advised on the technical aspects 
of policy recarrmendations which the Chab:men of the Carrmittees of Council 
would subsequently deal with as members of the Executive Camnittee to which 
the CAD would bring policy recommendations once they have been reviewed. by the 
Boa:rd of Management. At the Boa:rd of Management the heads of Divisions would 
have the advantage of having discussed policy proposals with the members of 
Council constituting the particular Ccmnittee with which they bad direct 
connection. In this way, the discussion of an issue in the Boa:rd of 
Management would be based on roth technical and political responses to the 
issue. Similarly, when a proposal came to the Executive Committee the nanbers 
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would have had the benefit of teclmical advice in addition to the political 
awareness that their elected position provided. This system also ensured that 
the members of the Executive Carmittee would be well infonnecl on both the 
technical and political aspects of policy issues and would be ade:;ruately 
briefed to take part in the discussion in Council when the Executive Corrmittee 
fo:rwm:ded its policy reccmnendations for review and ratification. The 
connections between the Executive Carmittee and the Boaid of Management, and 
the members of these two groups, would also wo:r:k in reverse and provide the 
channel through which Council became awa:re of the administrative activities of 
the government and could deal with such matters of administrative policy. as 
were within the responsibility of Council; by-laws and resolutions of Council 
dealing with procedures are an example. 
The Review Corrmittee was critical of the way in which information was being 
provided - or not provided - to the public and recomnended that this function 
should be examined to ensure that access to information was not being 
prevented by mmecessary use of canf:idential. classification of documents or by 
staff who did not accept the significance of the public's right to access. 
Size 
Preferred 
46- 0 
40- 45 
36- 39 
30- 35 
26- 29 
20- 25 
16- 19 
12- 15 
Total 
TABLEl 
Preferences of Those Who Expressed an Opinion on the Size of Council 
Councillors Individuals 
no. % no. % 
16 51.6 6 46.1 
1 3.2 0 
3 9.7 0 
1 3.2 0 
7 22.6 1 7.7 
1 7.7 
3 9.7 1 7.7 
0 3 23.1 
31 100 13 100 
Organizations 
no. % 
8 61S 
0 
2 15.4 
0 
1 7,7 
0 
1 7.7 
1 7.7 
13 100 
Private 
Submissions 
no. % 
0 
0 
1 25.0 
1 25.0 
0 
2 50.0 
0 
0 
4 100 
Total 
no % 
30 49.2 
1 1.6 
6 9.8 
3 4.9 
5.5 9.0 
6.5 10.7 
5 8.2 
4 6.6 
61 100 
86 
In any discussion of Unicit_y the question of the size of the Council is 
always raised. .Although the problems identified by the Review Corrmittee are 
not related only to this factor, but to lack of leadership and persistence of 
carmmmit_y, rather than cit_y-wide concerns, the Corrmittee was interested in the 
attitudes of those who made written and verbal presentations to them. Table 1 
is taken from the Corrmittee's Report, summarizes these attitudes. 
In SUII1Ual:Yr the Review Corrmittee found that Unicit_y bad sbme impressive 
achievements; a single tax base, unified rrrunicipal services, a formal 
mechanism for citizen participation and general acceptance of the nav fonn of 
government. However, fail i ngs and deficiencies were noted. These included 
lack of leadership, lack of accountability, confusion of roles and 
responsibilities arrong the politicians and the administrative officers, low 
staff :rrorale, CCIII!Plicated and cmnbersane approval processes - particularly in 
planning - and a nan:ow parochialism and neglect of large-scale, cit_y-wide 
policies in Council. The Corrmittee was convinced that the fundamental change 
in the system of civic government that they bad recarrmended was necessary to 
overcane these problems. They recognized that their recarmnendations of a 
:rrodified parliamentary fonn of cit_y government ran contrary to tradition which 
held that a "businesslike" way of providing for the service function was 
pararrount and that politics, in the partisan sense, bad no place in nnmicipal 
government. 
We recognize that such a step will nake Winnipeg unique a:rrong Canadian 
cities. No other Canadian city has a parliamentary fonn of government 
as fully developed as that which -we recc:mnend. But then· no other 
Canadian city" bas a system such as that which now exists in Winnipeg 
under the City" of Winnipeg Act. In Manitoba uniqueness and innovation 
have long been characteristic of both City and l'rovince in the search 
for the best answers to their political needs •... 
We are hopeful that both the Province and the City" - politicians and 
electors - will recognize the CC~II!P9lling logic of this present nnnent in 
the cit_y' s political evolution and will take the step which will 
establish the parliamentary fonn of government which will confinn and 
continue the tradition of creative political innovation which has marked 
the Cit_y's progress from its earliest beginnings. 
Neither the City nor· the Province accepted the Corrmittee's "carrq;:elling logic" 
but rejected the parliamentary fonn. The number of councillors was reduced 
from 50 to 29 and the number of Carmmmities was reduced from 12 to 6 by the 
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1977 amendment to the City of Winnipeg Act which made a mmiber of other 
relatively minor changes to the system in place. 
With the change in the incrnnbent of the Ma:yor's office, political 
leadership in Council i:mp:roved but most of the failings and shortcomings noted, 
by the Corrmittee continued with only marginal improvement. 
I.ocal government reform in Canada is poorer without the experience which 
could have been gained had the experiment with· parliamentary form in Winnipeg 
been .inplemented. 
14. E.VAIDATION OF UNICITY WINNIPH; 
The detailed study of the evolution of local government in Winnipeg which 
provides the basis for this report, ended ·at the time that changes were made 
following the Corrmittee of Review-. However, the author's interest in Winnipeg 
has continued, and it is hoped that there will be an opportunity in the future 
to return for sufficient time to pre:pc:rre a detailed post-script to this 
report. 
In attempting an evaluation of Unicity, a distinction nru.st be made between 
the original proposal and what was actually .inplemented. The original 
proposal was a major innovation and a radical departure fran what was familiar 
- a deliberate disregard for local political culture. It had the potential 
for satisfying all of the criteria for effective government, providing there 
would be a strong corrmit:.nEnt to the principles underlying the· reform and 
substantial political will to make it work. Sadly, political will was lacking 
and neither the elected councillors or the senior appointed officials -were 
corrmitted to the reform. As has already been mentioned, the decision to have 
the Ma:yor elected at large, rather than fran within Council, dealt a fatal 
blow to the idea of a "parliamentary" system and the opportunity for the 
majority group in Council to develop and .inlplement a policy platform under the 
watchful eyes of an CJ.[p)Siti.an. Had the original system been .inlplemented, it 
would have made it possible for elections to be fought on the basis of policy 
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and perfonnance rather than as a disoi:ganized contest between individual 
personalities. 
It has been said that election at large gives the Mayor a very strong power 
ba.se - and this is true. But in the case of Juba., for exanple, this power was 
exercised by an unprincipled loner and was used to support and enhance his 
personal reputation. The City as a whole benefitted from Juba.'s activities 
only on those rare occasions when the two kinds of gain - Juba.' s and the 
City's - coincided. With a different Mayor the results would have been 
different but, in the absence of election by Council, the essential check to 
the misuse, or misguided use of power was absent. The incmnbent Mayor's close 
connection with the ICEC group on Council provides a partial check, but the 
Mayor can ignore the views of the ICEC group if he wishes. There is no way in 
"Which the group can then apply sanctions. 
The recorrmendations of the Committee of Review- would have reinstated and 
strengthened the original concept and would have ensured the leader:sbip that 
was so obviously lacking in the system "Which was irrplerrented. Even with the 
system "Which was put in place, the Community Committees and their supporting 
Resident .Advisory Groups (RAGs) could have provided a· much irrproved level of 
:r::espaosiveness, opermess and :represen:tati.on.. But cammitrnent and will -were 
lacking. 
The Carrmittee of Review- also pointed out that, in spite of the detailed 
procedure "Which had been spelled out in the Act, there was still confusion and 
delay in the developnent approval process. This was attributed to the 
introduction of the Cormrnmity Ccmnittees and their RAGs "Which came to be seen·· 
as additional hurdles to be overcome. 
The partial centralization of services initiated by the Metro government 
was completed, and efficiency was irrproved thereby. Centralization of 
additional services and the provision of new- ones proved difficult because of 
lack of leadership, clear policy direction and political will. 
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Apart from the criticisms discussed al::xJve, a nore fundamental question that 
was raised in cormection with the int:rxxiuction of Metro govermnent also 
applies in this context; was Unicity over:-sold as the remedy to all of the 
ills of local governrrent in Winnipeg? It seems that there is much still to be 
learned about introducing substantial change in the structure and 
responsibilities of local governrrent, particularly when the· change is a 
radical departure from what has been acceptable in the past. 
'lb sumnarize, :ba.sed on the criteria set out at the beginning of this 
report: 
- efficiency has been improved 
- responsiveness has improved insofar as the suburban residents are 
concerned, but at the expense of those living in the central area 
- openness improved terrq;Joraril y in the early days, but the 
improvement did not :persist 
- representation improved initially with the larger Council, but 
deteriorated as a result of the changes that occurred subsequently 
- leadership, little effective leadership has been provided 
- flexibility did not change as a result of the refon:ns 
- carmi.:tment 1 like leadership 1 was lacking. 
15. c:r.INCUJSION 
'!his has been an account of changes in local. govermnent in . metropolitan 
Winnipeg over the last 35 years, :ba.sed on direct participation in sane of 
these changes and opportunities to discuss others with those who have been 
involved. Recent years at Waterloo have given an opportunity for reflection 
and have nodified the biases of a metropolitan partisan. Opportunities to 
explore what has been happening in other Canadian metropolitan areas and in 
Europe have also helped in trying to cane to grips with the nature of local 
govermnent in the final decades of the 20th century. 
Traditional wisdan holds that elected local gaverrnnent is the foundation of 
our fonn of derrocracy. It is also held that participation in the affairs of 
local govermnent is both the right and the responsibility of the citizen. 
Eoth these tenets need to be re-examined. 
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There is a substantial body of opinion that holds that services, 
particularly hard services, can be provided by managers with the necessary 
technical expertise and, if the services can be £inanced on the basis of user-
:pay, there are no political decisions to be made. The current interest in 
privatization further reinforces this view. Even if the service role of local 
govemnent can be substantially reduced, if not eliminated, there remains the 
political role - the resolution of local conflict over public decisions. 
A large number of citizens appear to have no interest in local govermnent, 
many do not vote and it is not nncarm10n for them not to know who their locally 
elected representative is; sometimes they may not be absolutely sure which 
:rm:rnici:pality they live in! However, citizens do £eel a strong need to 
partici:pate and exert influence When a decision is to be made that affects 
them directly- rezoning for higher density on their street, or an increase in 
property taxes due to the adoption of market value assess:rrent, for example. 
The opportunity to partici:pate is also used when a new need becomes 
apparent which cannot be satisfied by the private sector - day care for the 
children of same low-income families, for example. 
Finally, there may be a need to articulate a position on an issue that is 
national or international in scope, but where the senior responsible 
govermnents appear distant and nncaring. The large number of :rm:rnici:palities 
that have declared themselves to be nuclear free .zones is not evidence of a 
lack of understanding of constitutional responsibility but rather a 
manifestation of the need that individuals and groups feel to express 
themselves in a political formn on an issue that affects them directly. 
In all of these instances we tu:rn to local govermnent because it is 
physically accessible and because we feel that it will nnderstand and may 
share our particular "local" view of the situation. Finally, the knowledge 
that we can exert influence - even though we may never do so - is irrportant to 
us. On this basis, it can be seen that our fonn of derrocracy cannot fnnction 
without a local govermnent corrp:ment. Although service fnnctions, including 
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schools, might be provided through a decentralized system of provincial 
government, without municipalities the local political function would be lost . 
.As local government serves an essential purpose in our system the next 
question is, "what fonn should it take?" Discussion of the internal 
structures of 'local government is beyond the scope of this paper except to 
stress that the administrative function needs a point of focus and this nay 
be provided by a :rranager or by a small senior committee - a Board of 
Commissioners, for example. Similarly the policy making function also needs a 
point of focus, such as a strong :rra::yor or same fonn of executive committee of 
Council. 
The question nost ge:r:mane to this discussion is whether nor not a two-tier 
system is necessary. .Although the answer to this depends . on the local 
political culture to a large extent, there are very few circmnstances where it 
is not, or could not be, useful. In Canada we have seen ·a number of 
variations of the two-tier theme, including Regional Districts in British 
Columbia, Regional Municipalities in Ontario, Metropolitan Ccmmmities in 
Quebec and the many variations of inter-municipal special purpose boards and 
commissions. 
I.ooking specifically at the experience of Metro Winnipeg 1 this author is 
convinced that the two-tier system was working and with same adjustments such 
as those suggested by the IDeal Government Boundaries Commission in 1970, it 
could have continued to function effectively. 
At this point it is useful to take a second look at the critical corrments. 
contained in the Prowsals for Urban Reorganization in the Greater Winnipeg 
Area 1970 and the corrments of mre recent critics. The Proposals summarized 
the problem as follows: "planning and developrent are indivisible. " While 
agreeing with this statement, it should be remembered that Metro had the power 
to develop the essential infrastructure necessary to provide the fra:mework for 
private developrent. It also had exclusive authori-cy for developrent control 
and, with clarification of its powers to carry out urban renewal and housing 
schemes, it would have had all of the powers necessary to carry out the public 
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role in private initiative that puts IIDst of the urban developnent in place. 
The principal public role is to provide infrastructure and to control private 
develop:nent. 
Fragmented authority - with control of services divided, and the power 
to rrake decisions and carry them out fragmented, the cammunity' s human 
resources are dissipa.ted and its economic capabilities to a considerable 
extent squandered (emphasis added) . 
The authors of the Proposals and other critics vmo have :repeated this claim 
produced no evidence to support their stand. On the contrary, services -were 
expanded and the capital cost of these was bo:r:ne by the metropolitan area as a 
mole. There 'Were only two pa.rticipants involved in the decisions to extend 
services, the Metro Council and the Council of the area rrnmicipa.lity conce:r:ned 
- haidl y fragmentation. Furthermore, this division of responsibility was 
clearly understood by the pa.rticipants and the conce:r:ned public. If the 
reference to "human resources" is to the staff of both Metro and the area 
rrnmicipa.lities, the minutes of the Planning Corrmittee and Council indicate the 
volume of develop:nent decisions that -were made, the majority of vmich vvere the 
result of successful co-o:r:dination with the staff and Councils of the area 
rrnmicipalities conce:r:ned. The minority of develop:nent · decisions that became 
political issues did necessitate reconsideration of decisions and some waste 
of time, but reconsideration of some decisions is inevitable in any system. 
If the reference to "human resources" bas a wider connotation, the argument is 
difficult to follow. Similarly the statement that the economic capabilities-
vmich are undefined - are squandered by real or imagined fragmentation, is 
unsubstantiated. It is also ironic to note that Unicity, the system that was 
put in place to remedy these ills, created a new kind of confusion and 
fragmentation. Developnent decisions -were made through an even ·IIDre COII[>lex 
process involving Carmnmity Corrmittees, Corrmittees of Council, an Executive 
Corrmittee, a Boaid of Corrmissioners and Unicity staff advising at both 
Carmnmity and City levels. The record of perfonnance of Unicity indicates 
that a familiar system, Metro, was replaced by a IIDre complex and unfamiliar 
system, Unicity. 
There is a wide disparity in the quality and level of services between 
one rrnmicipa.lity and another .••. 
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Yet another unsubstantiated statement. Where these differences existed they 
'Were the result of the decisions of the area nnmicipalities 1 not Metro. 'lb 
question the right of a locally elected Council to make decisions on the 
quality and level of services tbat its carmnmity could affo:rd sounds rather 
strange coming from the advocates of a "decentralized political system. " 
Surely the purpose of decentralization is to allOW" local areas to make the 
decisions about their own public services 1 a pu:rpose tbat must also result in 
differences in levels of service? 
The remainder of the criticisms contained in the Proposals .. are in the same 
vein . and are equally unsubstantiated and are very nn.Ich an echo of the rhetoric 
of the social and political literature of the day. 
Both the documentation and verbal presentations to the Cumming Cormnission 
and the subsequent work of the Boundaries Cormnission support the principle of 
a two-tier system. The response to the Proposals did not produce supporting 
evidence of confusion and dissatisfaction, in fact the subsequent introduction 
of Unicity produced confusion in the minds of citizens -which still persists, 
and created marked differences in the level of sarre services provided 'When the 
suburbs are compared with the central city. 
It is interesting to note tbat a IIDre recent evaluation of Metro66 -while 
aclmOW"ledging that "Metro's achievements 'Were numerous" presents· the view that 
its najor achievement was to pave the way for unification. Two-tier 
govenrrrent as a precursor to unification, though often argued, is by no means 
inevitable as the experience in Ontario and British Coltnnbia bears out. The 
authors Brownstone and Plunkett lay considerable stress on the significance of 
Mayor Juba and claim that part of their nandate - as initiators of Unicity-
was to eliminate Juba as a local political force. While hesitating to differ 
with such a well info:rmed and involved opinion, the emphasis on one powerful 
individual, though understandable to anyone with experience of Winnipeg 
politics of the period, seems to distort evaluation of the system itself. 
Juba has nOW" retired but even a superficial view of the current situation 
indicates that the strengths of the system have not becarre apparent and the 
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problems of political decision-making attributed. to Juba.' s influence have not 
been eliminated.. 
Metro's achieverrEilts are also described favourably by another recent 
evaluation. 
Metro was able to plan and complete roads, bridges, parks, and other 
public works at an impressive rate. Given the circumscribed 
expectations of its creators, the experiment must be counted. at least a 
qualified success.67 
The same authors, when comnenting on Unicity, question whether it overcame 
the deficiency of other structural refonns in Canada, including Metro 
Winnipeg, which had "failed utterly to strengthen its [local government's] 
embryonic political role and capability." While acknowledging that Unicity 
has been cited as the exception to this rule,. Kiernan and Walker conclude 
that: 
despite the claims of its proponents, the institutional refonn of 
Winnipeg's local government [Unicity] failed to produce discernable 
changes in policy or politicization. 68 
In spite of the fact that the Unicity refonn directly addressed the 
question of politicization of local government, it was unsuccessful in this 
regani. 
The history of Canadian local government, including Winnipeg, bears 
arrple testimJny to public resistance to even the introduction of party 
politics. The ethos of anti-partisanship dies extremely hard - if it 
can be induced to die at all. 69 
One final speculation is offered concerning Unicity in its original fonn, 
or if the reccmnendations of the Taraska Carrmittee had been adopted. If 
Unicity Council had been organized on .. a parliameotary basis with party 
discipline and an established program which the group in power was carrmitted 
to carrying out, and assmning that the Councillors accepted this role, how 
-would they have acted in their other role as Cc:mrnmity Corrmittee member? 
Would the Corrnnmities with a majority of members from the party in power have 
gained, while those with a majority of opposition members lost, insofar as 
local benefits vvere concerned? Would there have been a difference in 
priority, given the "t:'wo roles, by members in positions of power (Carrmittee 
Chai.J::rren, for exarrple) and those who vvere back-bench.ers? 
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The two Winni:peg refonns offer useful opportunities for corrp:rrison, not 
only in the structural sense, but .also in the way in "Which the palitical role 
was addressed. Differences in the way in which the refonns vvere developed and 
irrplemented also provides interesting contrasts. Both refonns demonstrate 
strong resistance to the politicization of local government - Metro because it 
was not seen as an issue relevant to local government at that time, and 
Unicity because, although it was a major feature of the refonn as originally 
proposed, it was traded-away in the negotiations that took place prior to 
passage of the legislation. 
The study of Winni:peg in particular and other carmnmities in canada in 
general, leads me to certain conclusions about local government in the latter 
part of the twentieth century. Our system of democratic government requires 
an elected local council to provide a direct and responsible link with the 
citizens. 
decisions. 
This is essential if the citizens are to participate in public 
As there are no universally accepted criteria for defining the geographic 
area of local government, the existing areas should fonn the building blocks 
of any refonned system. They are familiar and identification with them 
develops a sense of belonging. 
A two-tier system has Imlch to carrmend it in those areas where a group , of 
local governments is to be maintained. A mechanism will be required to deal 
with inter-Imlnicipal and area-wide issues. 
The service role of local government should be reassessed periodically. 
Same services ma.y be irrproved by privatization, or by reallocation to an upper 
tier government or a province. 
The political role needs to be stressed and legitimized. This does not 
necessarily mean the introduction of partisan politics. ContertpJrary methods 
of consensus-building based on easy access to irifo:r::ma.tion, and the resolution 
of conflict by mediation rather than the adversarial method should be 
explored. 
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The strength of local government will be reinforced by giving it final 
responsibility for as_ many decisions as possible. The power- of provincial 
gavernrnents or their appointed administratiVe tri.bunals to supervise and 
supercede the decisions of local government should ·be severely restricted, if 
not eliminated. 
These conclusions are offered for discussion in the hope that they, or 
other similar points of departure, can provide the basis for a well-reasoned 
and compelling basis for local government in the future. 
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